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There's always been a kind of last resort argument for those of us who think the brain must ultimately be capable of simulation on a computer. OK, you don't accept that any of the existing theories is any good; OK, you think when computers play chess or whatever, they're actually doing it in a completely different way. But at the end of the day, the brain is just another physical object. If it comes to it, we can just simulate the whole thing. We can model every single neuron in a real brain. What then? We don't even need to understand how the brain works; if we copy it exactly, it will work, just as if we copied all the parts of an old-fashioned watch without having any ideas about horology. If we do that, we just will have consciousness functioning in a computer - there really is no denying it short of some hopeless retreat into dualism or whatever. Now you've always said that such a model was impossible, not just in practice, which seemed obvious, but also in principle. Guess what? Somebody's actually going to do it. The Blue Brain project, (a joint venture of the Brain Mind Institute, EPFL, Switzerland and IBM, USA) has the eventual aim of applying terrific computer power to the simulation of an entire brain. It's not going to happen overnight, but it's going to happen. |
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Hang on a minute. Aren't
you exaggerating? So far as I can see, all they plan to do is
simulate one of the columnar structures in the cortex. That's a tiny
fraction of a whole brain.
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That's the
initial stage. It's a significant step forward in itself, but the ultimate
aim is a total brain simulation. What I'd like to know is what you think
makes this impossible? What's going to stop them, given enough raw
computing power? If you accept that the brain obeys the same laws of
physics as the rest of the world, I just don't see what's to stop a
simulation. Really, you're just betting against the progress of
technology. That's always been a bad idea. You're putting yourself in the
same camp as those people who said heavier-than-air flight was impossible
in principle. | |
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I very much doubt if it's as bad as that. You
have to remember that however sophisticated the behaviour of neurons may be, they
ultimately only do one thing: fire - or fail to fire. I
actually think that modelling all the vast number of connections is going
to be more of a challenge than worrying about neurotransmitters or glial
cells, but in any case get this - they are modelling
on a molecular level. | |
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What! I... I
actually don't think I believe that. | |
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Well, it actually isn't
completely clear what the whole-brain project will eventually be like, but
certainly some of the existing work is at a molecular level. And in the
current columnar project,
I believe each processor is supposed to handle only
a few neurons - plenty of capacity for really fine detail, I should
have thought. | |
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I have to ask - don't you suspect this is a just a marketing ploy on the part of IBM? | |
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Oh, it
clearly is, but so what? Doesn't mean it won't work. I see your point
about the column in isolation, but I don't think anybody is naive enough
to think it's an unpluggable component. It's just such an obviously
salient structure that it's clearly worth studying. | |
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The other thing is, whose brain are they going to be simulating?
There are lots of detailed differences between the way one person's brain
is wired, and another's. Now it's quite likely that some of the properties
of that pattern of wiring are essential to consciousness, while others are
just individual variation. If you don't have some theoretical
understanding already, how are you going to be able to tell which is
which? | |
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You really are clutching at straws now, aren't you? I can see
it must be traumatic when events force you to reconsider your whole
iintellectual outlook. | |
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You see, it's important that the causal relations operating in an artificial intelligence are the same (in the relevant respects, whatever they may be) as the causal relations operating in a real brain. But if it's a computer simulation, they never will be. In the real brain, the firing of neuron A causes the firing of neuron B: in the computer, both events are caused by the instructions in a lot of code. It's the difference between someone who walks because of the muscles in their legs, and someone who walks because a puppeteer is pulling the relevant strings. | |
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No, that's false. It's more like this. Suppose you had
a universal shape-mimicking device. Now you set some of these little
machines to mimic the shape of cogs in a clock. When you put it together,
it all works: now they're just simulated cogs, and internally they're
doing all sorts of calculations and monitoring in order to keep the right
form: but does that mean it isn't a clock? That it doesn't tell the time?
Obviously not. The causal relations in the simulation are more complex,
but they've been set up in such a way that the overall pattern is the
same. Of course no-one gets wet from computer rain: all that means
is that our brain simulation won't generate sloppy piles of white and grey
gunk. It's not the physical nature of the thing that matters; it's the
ability to perform in certain ways - yes, ultimately to have a coherent
conversation, for example. You know this is true really - you don't
recognise consciousness by the physical qualities of someone's brain, but
by their behaviour - whether they answer you and what the quality of their
answer is. This idea about some magic property of biological brains is an
idea that would never have occurred to you if you hadn't needed a
bolt-hole to hide in. When a real simulation comes along, that bolt-hole
is going to become pretty uncomfortable. | |
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