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Electromagnetic
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30 May
2004 | |
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We have become
used to hearing that novel theories of quantum
mechanics might somehow account for consciousness. A theory which invokes
only common or garden electromagnetism seems refreshingly simple
by comparison - almost naively simple at first sight. But
such is the hypothesis put forward by Susan Pockett in her book 'The
Nature of Consciousness'. The hypothesis can be briefly stated -
'consciousness is identical with certain spatiotemporal patterns in
the electromagnetic field' .
The original inspiration
for the theory apparently lies in the sense of cosmic oneness described in
Hinduism and (rather an unexpected choice) Plato. Pointing out that the
ancients had some handy ideas about atoms, Pockett suggests we could
similarly look for ancestral wisdom as a starting point for an enquiry
into consciousness. One possible clue, according to her, is that one can
find in Hinduism (and Plato) the idea of a fundamental underlying unity, a
universal consciousness. I don't think anyone would have argued very
much if she had claimed it was a common feature of mystical experience in
virtually all religions, actually. This mystical element is clearly
important to her, since it is brought back in to round off the book's
conclusion. |
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Oh great. Good to know we're
dealing with hard science again. |
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Well, actually we are. If you
want scrupulous quotation of authoritative empirical evidence, you won't
be disappointed here. The theory may be mystically inspired, but being a practical
New Zealander, brought up, as she says, to believe any problem can be solved
with baler twine, Pockett quickly gives it a more concrete form. This universal
consciousness, she asks - doesn't that sound a bit like some kind of
field? If consciousness were some kind of
electromagnetic effect, it could be part of the universal electromagnetic
field, and hence genuinely part of a cosmic unity. Now, you wouldn't want
it to lose its separate existence altogether, or even leak across to other
people in the form of telepathy (at least, not obviously), but that's
OK. If we were talking about very low frequency fluctuations, in the 0-100
Hz range, they wouldn't propagate very far and would remain pretty much
isolated, barring the kind of jolt to the brain which would have
significant physical effects in any case.
Is there any reason to
think that the brain might work at this kind of frequency, and that if it
does, that the relevant patterns vary in a way that matches the
variation of conscious experience? |
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Before we can
consider the match with conscious states, we need to be a bit clearer
about the kind of consciousness we mean. Pockett is only talking about the
kind of subjective, phenomenal consciousness we almost certainly share
with animals - qualia, in fact, not articulate, decision-making,
reflective consciousness. She identifies three different states of
consciousness - waking, dreaming, and dreamless sleep - and suggests
there might be grounds for accepting another - a half-way state between
waking and sleep which she identifies with the kind of meditative
trance mystics go in for. It appears that EEG evidence does indeed
show various wave patterns at suitable frequencies for all three (or
four) of these conscious states. So far so good. |
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The next step is
to examine the evidence for covariance between these EEG patterns and
conscious sensations. It's characteristic of Pockett's
agreeably down-to-earth style that smell, for once, is tackled first
and gets a fair share of the attention, along with hearing and
vision. These chapters form an interesting survey in their own right,
though the details don't matter much from our point of view. Covariance
turns out to be relatively easy to establish in simple organisms, but in
human beings rather a lot of processing of the relevant data is required.
Nevertheless, I think most people would be happy to accept the broad
conclusion that there is, indeed, evidence for covariance in all
three senses.
Covariance, of course,
is not enough in itself to establish the truth of Pockett's hypothesis.
Most people, as she recognises, would be inclined to say that the
relationship between conscious sensations and electromagnetic
patterns is due to the fact that they both arise from the same
patterns of neural activity. I don't think Pockett has a knock-down
argument against this one: essentially she thinks it is much easier to
conceive of consciousness as 'just being' a shimmering electromagnetic
field than 'just being' patterns of neural activity - she even seems to
suggest that the latter view tends towards dualism - but I'm not
convinced. |
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So why should we believe
in the hypothesis? I think there are three main points. One is the 'mystic
unity' argument. To find this appealing, you have to believe in some kind
of cosmic unity of consciousness to begin with, of course. But even
if you do, I'm not sure the theory backs it up as strongly as Pockett
suggests. At one point she sums it up quite accurately by saying that the
'spots' of consciousness within the overall cosmic field are like the
red spots on a spotted handkerchief, which, in a sense, confer the quality
of redness on the handkerchief. But that doesn't, except in a stretched or
metaphorical sense, make it a red handkerchief or unite the spots in a
handkerchief-wide redness. Pockett herself has to argue for isolation of
individual consciounesses in order to defend herself against suggestions
that if her theory were true, we should all be telepathic, or disrupted
by electromagnetic events around us. I don't, ultimately, find
myself tempted by Pockett's suggestion that her ideas, similarly, mean
that the Cosmos itself is conscious.
The
second point is a claim that the theory solves the binding problem - how
conscious experience appears unified although the data from different
sense organs makes its way into the brain at different times. If
everything feeds into a single overall electromagnetic pattern, unity is
guaranteed. This is a tempting idea, and a real prize if it worked. I
think in the final analysis it underrates what we already know about
the importance of neural events to sensory experiences. Since the theory
only deals with qualia-style consciousness, it also leaves us with a problem on
our hands about how sensory data feed into the other, cogitative
form of consciousness. Nevertheless, I don't think the idea that electromagnetic effects are relevant here can be
entirely dismissed. |
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The third, and most
startling point is that if Pockett is right, it is possible in
principle to recreate the patterns which constitute conscious experience
without a brain at all. Conscious computers are the least of it - if this
is right you can generate a conscious experience of, say, the colour
orange, in empty space. Pockett presumes that if someone's brain were
moved to coincide with such a floating experience, the owner of the brain
would indeed 'have' that experience. If Pockett could indeed find a
practical way of 'beaming' chosen experiences into someone's mind
(without, presumably, the need to know any details about the particular
brain involved) it would be a most dramatic
vindication. |
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I'm not holding my
breath, though - it just seems unlikely that the electromagnetic aspect of
the brain could ever be so thoroughly divorced from the neural activity.
This touches on a basic problem with the theory which comes out in a
number of different ways. One of the objections discussed and dismissed in
the book is that electromagnetic fields can't do computation. Now, as a
matter of fact I think the objection, as stated, is on dubious grounds
anyway. It isn't clear to me that the kind of consciousness under
discussion - qualia, subjective experience - is meant, by those who
espouse it, to be computational anyway. But there is, I think, a problem
about causal relations in the electromagnetic theory. It seems a
little odd to think of electromagnetic patterns causing other
electromagnetic patterns without physical objects - neurons, in fact -
playing a role somewhere. The implication is either that some compromise
with the neural perspective is needed (I think there are a number of
reasonable options along these lines), or that the kind of consciousness
under discussion is epiphenomenal - has no causal relevance. This latter
view is, of course, virtually the orthodox one among qualists, but it
involves considerable difficulty.
Pockett herself
published a paper in the JCS recently declaring for epiphenomenalism,
though whether she means the (indefensible in my view) hard philosophical
version, or the unproblematic psychological version is still, I think,
open to discussion. |
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I'm not
convinced, but pending the arrival of an electromagnetic
conscious-experience-synthesising machine, I think the hypothesis at least
remains among the small and praiseworthy company of ideas about
consciousness which are rational, clear, and in principle
testable. |
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Ah - excuse me, but
doesn't it miss the whole point of mystical religious experience (in a
typically flat-footed Western materialist way) to explain it as
being a lot of radio waves? Isn't transcendence of the physical something
to do with it...?
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