Tag Archives: journal

PhiMiFi

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If there’s one thing philosophers of mind like more than an argument, it’s a rattling good yarn. Obviously we think of Mary the Colour Scientist, Zombie Twin (and Zimboes, Zomboids, Zoombinis…) , the Chinese Room (and the Chinese Nation), Brain in a Vat, Swamp-Man, Chip-Head, Twin Earth and Schmorses… even papers whose content doesn’t include narratives at this celebrated level often feature thought-experiments that are strange and piquant. Obviously philosophy in general goes in for that kind of thing too – just think of the trolley problems that have been around forever but became inexplicably popular in the last year or so (I was probably force-fed too many at an impressionable age, and now I can’t face them – it’s like broccoli, really): but I don’t think there’s another field that loves a story quite like the Mind guys.

I’ve often alluded to the way novelists have been attacking the problems of minds by other means ever since the James Boys (Henry and William) set up their pincer movement on the stream of consciousness; and how serious novelists have from time to time turned their hand to exploring the theme consciousness with clear reference to academic philosophy, sometimes even turning aside to debunk a thought experiment here and there. We remember philosophically  considerable works of genuine science fiction such as  Scott Bakker’s Neuropath. We haven’t forgotten how Ian  and Sebastian Faulks in their different ways made important contributions to the field of Bogus but Totally Convincing Psychology with De Clérambault’s Syndrome and Glockner’s Isthmus, nor David Lodge’s book ‘Consciousness and the Novel’ and his novel Thinks. And philosophers have not been averse to writing the odd story, from Dan Lloyd’s novel Radiant Cool up to short stories by many other academics including Dennett and Eric Schwitzgebel.

So I was pleased to hear (via a tweet from Eric himself) of the inception of an unexpected new project in the form of the Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy. The Journal ‘aims to foster the appreciation of science fiction as a medium for philosophical reflection’.   Does that work? Don’t science fiction and philosophy have significantly different objectives? I think it would be hard to argue that all science fiction is of philosophical interest (other than to the extent that everything is of philosophical interest). Some space opera and a disappointing amount of time travel narrative really just consists of adventure stories for which the SF premise is mere background. Some science fiction (less than one might expect) is actually about speculative science. But there is quite a lot that could almost as well be called Phifi as Scifi, stories where the alleged science is thinly or unconvincingly sketched, and simply plays the role of enabler for an examination of social, ethical, or metaphysical premises. You could argue that Asimov’s celebrated robot short stories fit into this category; we have no idea how positronic brains are supposed to work, it’s the ethical dilemmas that drive the stories.

There is, then, a bit of an overlap; but surely SF and philosophy differ radically in their aims? Fiction aims only to entertain; the ideas can be rubbish so long as they enable the monsters or, slightly better, boggle the mind, can’t they? Philosophy uses stories only as part of making a definite case for the truth of particular positions, part of an overall investigative effort directed, however indirect the route, at the real world? There’s some truth in that, but the line of demarcation is not sharp. For one thing, successful philosophers write entertainingly; I do not think either Dennett or Searle would have achieved recognition for their arguments so easily if they hadn’t been presented in prose clear enough for non-academic readers to  understand, and well-crafted enough to make them enjoy the experience.  Moreover, philosophy doesn’t have to present the truth; it can ask questions or just try to do some of that  mind boggling. Myself when I come to read a philosophical paper I do not expect to find the truth (I gave up that kind of optimism along with the broccoli): my hopes are amply fulfilled if what I read is interesting. Equally, while fiction may indeed consist of amusing lies, novelists are not indifferent to the truth, and often want to advance a hypothesis, or at least, have us entertain one.

I really think some gifted novelist should take the themes of the famous thought-experiments and attempt to turn them into a coherent story. Meantime. there is every prospect that the new journal represents, not dumbing down but wising up, and I for one welcome our new peer-reviewers.

Are we aware of concepts?

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jennifer2Are ideas conscious at all? Neuroscience of Consciousness is a promising new journal from OUP introduced by the editor Anil Seth here. It has an interesting opinion piece from David Kemmerer which asks – are we ever aware of concepts, or is conscious experience restricted to sensory, motor and affective states?

On the face of it a rather strange question? According to Kemmerer there are basically two positions. The ‘liberal’ one says yes, we can be aware of concepts in pretty much the same kind of way we’re aware of anything. Just as there is a subjective experience when we see a red rose, there is another kind of subjective experience when we simply think of the concept of roses. There are qualia that relate to concepts just as there are qualia that relate to colours or smells, and there is something it is like to think of an idea. Kemmerer identifies an august history for this kind of thinking stretching back to Descartes.

The conservative position denies that concepts enter our awareness. While our behaviour may be influenced by concepts, they actually operate below the level of conscious experience. While we may have the strong impression that we are aware of concepts, this is really a mistake based on awareness of the relevant words, symbols, or images. The intellectual tradition behind this line of thought is apparently a little less stellar – Kemmerer can only push it back as far as Wundt – but it is the view he leans towards himself.

So far so good – an interesting philosophical/psychological issue. What’s special here is that in line with the new journal’s orientation Kemmerer is concerned with the neurological implications of the debate and looks for empirical evidence. This is an unexpected but surely commendable project.

To do it he addresses three particular theories. Representing the liberal side he looks at Global Neural Workspace Theory (GNWT) as set out by Dehaene, and Tononi’s Integrated information Theory (IIT)’ on the conservative side he picks the Attended Intermediate-Level Representation Theory (AIRT) of Prinz. He finds that none of the three is fully in harmony with the neurological evidence, but contends that the conservative view has distinct advantages.

Dehaene points to research that identified specific neurons in a subject’s anterior temporal lobes that fire when the subject is shown a picture of, say, Jennifer Aniston (mentioned on CE – rather vaguely). The same neuron fires when shown photographs, drawing, or other images, and even when the subject is reporting seeing a picture of Aniston. Surely then, the neuron in some sense represents not an image but the concept of Jennifer Aniston?  against theconservative view Kemmerer argues that while a concept may be at work, imagery is always present in the conscious mind; indeed, he contends,  you cannot think of ‘Anistonicity’ in itself without a particular image of Aniston coming to mind. Secondly he quotes further research which shows that deterioration of this portion of the brain impairs our ability to recognise, but not to see, faces. This, he contends, is good evidence that while these neurons are indeed dealing with general concepts at some level, they are contributing nothing to conscious awareness, reinforcing the idea that concepts operate outside awareness. According to Tononi we can be conscious of the idea of a triangle, but how can we think of a triangle without supposing it to be equilateral, isosceles, or scalene?

Turning to the conservative view, Kemmerer notes that AIRT has awareness at a middle level, between the jumble of impressions delivered by raw sensory input on the one hand, and the invariant concepts which appear at the high level. Conscious information must be accessible but need not always be accessed.  It is implemented as gamma vector waves. This is apparently easier to square with the empirical data than the global workspace, which implies that conscious attention would involve a shift into the processing system in the lateral prefrontal cortex where there is access to working memory – something not actually observed in practice. Unfortunately although the AIRT has a good deal of data on its side the observed gamma responses don’t in fact line up with reported experience in the way you would expect if it’s correct.

I think the discussion is slightly hampered by the way Kemmerer uses ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’ as synonyms. I’d be tempted to reserve awareness for what he is talking about, and allow that concepts could enter consciousness without our being (subjectively) aware of them. I do think there’s a third possibility being overlooked in his discussion – that concepts are indeed in our easy-problem consciousness while lacking the hard-problem qualia that go with phenomenal experience. Kemmerer alludes to this possibility at one point when he raises Ned Block’s distinction between access and phenomenal  (a- and p-consciousness), but doesn’t make much of it.

Whatever you think of Kemmerer’s ambivalent;y conservative conclusion, I think the way the paper seeks to create a bridge between the philosophical and the neurological is really welcome and, to a degree, surprisingly successful. If the new journal is going to give us more like that it will definitely be a publication to look forward to.