No problem

The older I get, the less impressed I am by the hardy perennial of free will versus determinism. It seems to me now like one of those completely specious arguments that the Sophists supposedly used to dumbfound their dimmer clients.

One of their regulars, apparently went like this. Your dog has had pups? And it belongs to you? Then it’s a mother, and it’s yours. Ergo, it’s your mother!!!

If we can take this argument seriously enough to diagnose it, we might point out that ‘your’ is a word with several distinct uses. One is to pick out items that are your legal property; another is the wider one of picking out items that pertain to you in some other sense. We can, for example, use it to pick out the single human being that is your immediate female progenitor. So long as we are clear about these different senses, no problem arises.

Is free will like that? The argument goes something like this. Your actions were ultimately determined by the laws of physics. An action which was determined in advance is not free. Ergo, physics says none of your actions were free!!!

But there are two entirely different senses of “determined” in play here. When I ask if you had a free choice, I’m not asking a metaphysical question about whether an interruption to the causal sequence occurred. I’m asking whether you had a gun to your head, or something like that.

Now some might argue that although the two senses are distinct, the physics one over-rides the psychological one and renders it meaningless. But it doesn’t. A metaphysical interruption to the causal sequence wouldn’t give me freedom anyway; it might give me a random factor, but freedom is not random. What I want to know is, did your actions arise out of your conscious thoughts, or did external factors constrain them? That’s all. The undeniable fact that my actions are ultimately constrained by the laws of nature simply isn’t what I’m concerned with.

That constraint really is undeniable, of course; in fact we don’t really need physics. If the world is coherent at all it must be governed by laws, and those laws must determine what happens. If things happened for no reason, we could make no sense of anything. So any comprehensive world view must give us some kind of determinism. We know this well enough, because we are familiar with at least one other comprehensive theory; the view that things happen only because God wills them. This means everything is predestined, and that gives rise to just the same sort of pseudo-problems over free will. In fact, if we want we can get the same problems from logical fatalism, without appealing to either science or theology. Will I choose A tomorrow or not? Necessarily there is a truth of the matter already, so although we cannot know, my decision is already a matter of fact, and in that sense is already determined.

So fundamental determinism is rock solid; it just isn’t a problem for freedom.

Hold on, you may say; you frame this as being about external constraints, but the real question is, am I not constrained internally? Don’t my own mental processes force me to make a particular decision? There are two versions of this argument. The first says that the mere fact that mental processes operate mechanistically means there can be no freedom. I just deny that; my own conscious processes count as a source of free decisions no matter how mechanistic they may be, just so long as they’re not constrained from outside.

The second version of the argument says that while free decisions of that kind might be possible in pure theory, as an empirical matter human beings don’t have the capacity for them. No conscious processes are actually effectual; consciousness is an epiphenomenon and merely invents rationales for decisions taken in a predetermined manner elsewhere in the brain. This argument is appealing because there is, of course, lots of evidence that unconscious factors influence our decisions. But the strong claim that my conscious deliberations are always irrelevant seems wildly implausible to me. Speech acts are acts, so to truly believe this strong version of the theory I’d have to accept that what I think is irrelevant to what I say, or that I adjust my thoughts retrospectively to fit whatever just came out of my mouth (I’m not saying there aren’t some people of whom one could believe this).

Now I may also be attacked from the other side. There may be advocates of free will who say, hold on, Peter, we do actually want that special metaphysical interruption you’re throwing away so lightly. Introspect, dear boy, and notice how your decisions come from nowhere; that over and above the weighing of advantage there just is that little element of inexplicable volition.

This impression comes, I think, from the remarkable power of intentionality. We can think about anything at all, including future or even imaginary contingencies. If our actions are caused by things that haven’t happened yet, or by things that will never actually happen (think of buying insurance) that looks like a mysterious disruption of the natural order of cause and effect. But of course it isn’t really. You may have a different explanation depending on your view of intentionality; mine is briefly that it’s all about recognition. Our ability to recognise entities that extend into the future, and then recognise within them elements that don’t yet exist, gives us the ability to make plans for the future, for example, without any contradiction of causality.

I’m afraid I’ve ended up by making it sound complicated again. Let me wrap it up in time-honoured philosophical style: it all depends what you mean by “determined”…

 

64 thoughts on “No problem

  1. A recent series of YouTube talks by Seth Anil, I think, sheds a new light on this. His view is that, in addition to percepts coming in and forming internal concepts, prediction plays a major role. He talks about prediction on a fraction-of-a-second (or so) time scale. Just in time to be evaluated in the decision of what to do next. For my money, working out a time scale makes a big difference in a rationale for how it all comes about.

  2. Peter,

    your posts are always so fantastic. but I want to push back against a very common viewpoint that must be wrong. you express it very well with this sentence:

    “If the world is coherent at all it must be governed by laws, and those laws must determine what happens.”

    This simply cannot be true. This perspective on the world is like a person playing a video game. the “rules” of the game are determined extrinsically to the game, in programs. the programmer of the video game is, essentially, God. But the physical universe cannot be like this.

    tl;dr:
    In short, if the universe is deterministic, it requires a determiner mechanism. And we have no evidence such a mechanism exists. Thereore the universe is not deterministic. But the universe does adhere to patterns of activity. Physical activity results from the intrinsic functionality of the invididual particles in the universe. And patterns of activity are side-effects of particles and systems of particles interacting – intrinsically. An instinsically caused universe does not prevent the particles from forming systems which make patterns and where pattern forming particle systems interact with pattern generating systems in a bi-directional way – such that we could see intention and ideas and qualia form in systems as side-effects of intrinsic particle phenomena.

    The deterministic viewpoint requires that the laws which govern phsyical phenomena be extrinsic to the physical phenomena. Said another way, the “laws” must be a kind of algorithm which determines the behavior of matter like atoms and molecules. But atoms and molecules are not components of algorithms. Which leads one to ask: What is the mechanism which forces the physical phenomena to follow the extrinsic laws?

    There must be some other mechanism (neither phsyical nor made of the “laws”) which correlates or forces, – or simulates – the function of physical phenomena in accordance with extrinsic algorithms. If there is some extrinsic law, there must be a mechanism which expresses that law as a function in the physical universe. What is that mechanism?

    Sometimes people refer to this mechanism as “causation” itself. But that does not actually tell us how a mechanism, which connects external laws to physical functions, operates.

    The next question is: what causes the extrinsic laws themselves to exist? And what causes them to be the particular laws that they are? That is, how are the specific laws instantiated and selected?

    This second line of questioning is identical in form the critique of Cartesian duality and leads us towards an infinite regress. Descartes himself would answer both questions with, “God does it.”

    But again, this is a programmers point of view. What caused the programmer to choose the particular algorithms they used for their program? And what is the computational mechanism which makes the physical phenomena adhere to the algorithms? And what created the programmer – the system behind the mechanism? This set of questions regresses infinitely.

    The deterministic point of view also forms the basis for the possibility the physical universe may be a simulation. If the universe is governed by extrinsic laws, then the physical universe behaves exactly like a simulation. And what disproves the physical universe is a simulation or deterministic is consciousness itself.

    We know that consciousness exists, or at the least, that phenomena of consciousness exist. And we know that these phenomena are not themselves physical. Ideas, thoughts, qualia, and information are not physical – they are not made from electrons, or atoms or molecules. Which means there must also be a mechanism which allows the non-physical features of consciousness to interact with and affect the physical phenomena of electrons, atoms and molecules.

    This mind-body/intentionality problem does not require free will. It merely requires that there are ideas which cause physical activity. And that there are physical phenomena which produce ideas. And we know this actually happens because that is how experience works. For example 700nm and 410nm wavelength photons of light do not create magenta. Magenta is a qualia phenomena, not a physical phenomena. We do not see red and violet colors; we see [red and violet light] as magenta. Magenta is a representational phenomena which is part of consciousness. Magenta is not a phsyical phenomena.

    Which means that in a simulation or an extrinsically determined universe, there must be yet another extrinsic mechanism which interfaces the phsyical phenomena like wavelengths to the representational phenomena of colors – and which interfaces the representational phenomena to the functions which cause physical phenomena. Otherwise, I would be unable to move my eyes and arms to choose the magenta flowers for my garden. There must be an extrinsic mechanism which causes the magenta to initiate phsyical activity.

    Which is where free will appears to creep in. We naturally assert that it is free-will which is the mechanism by which intentionality operates. When representational content or qualia are used as the initiators of physical action, we appeal to a force called free-will to explain how the information causes the physical activity. Which means the mechanism of free-will must perturb the determinsitic mechanism in some way.

    In a deterministic simulation or a deterministic universe where consciousness exists, there must be some extrinsic mechanism that interfaces the representational phenomena to the physical phenomena in some kind of bi-directional causation. But that mechanism cannot be part of the mechanisms which determine physical functions (that is what free-will effects demonstrate). Which shows there must be some kind of arbiter mechanism which mediates when the bi-directional causation function occurs or when deterministic physical functions occur. There must be some kind of arbiter between the determinism function or the free-will function. What causes the arbiter to function?

    the deterministic viewpoint is overly complicated.

    Where there is consciousness, the deterministic viewpoint also becomes contradictory. The example of this is when a programmer of a video game tries to imbue their non-player characters with this mechanism we call “free will”. And no one has even the least inkling how. And the reason is, there is no such mechanism. And there is no such mechanism, because it’s impossible to have such a mechanism in a deterministic system.

    Physical determinism contradicts the possiblity of non-physical phenomena like qualia and ideas. (Searle’s semantic/syntax arguments show up here). Determinism requires rules which determine the behavior of the system. But, rules are ideas and are not phsyical, thus determinism is self-contradictory.

    A better model, which at least allows for the possibility of conscious phenomena without being self-contradictory, is when the cause of physical phenomena are intrinsic to the phsyical phenomena themselves. that is, the physical elements contain, in themselves, the functions which produce their behavior. And that is what we see in quantum phsyics. Physical particles behave and intereact because of their intrinsic qualities, not because of an extrinsic law (which would require an extrinsic mechanism).

    There is nothing to prevent an intrinsically caused set of physical interactions from generating a system of interaction that has patterns of activity – as side-effects – from the intrinsic behavior of the particles themselves. And there is nothing in such a system to prevent these side-effect patterns from correlating to physical activitity. Such that, when a side-effect pattern occurs a correlated physical phenomena occurs. And when an underlying physical phenomena occurs, the side-effect pattern occurs. That is, the physical phenomena can instantiate a pattern and the occurrence of a pattern is an instance of a physical phenomena.

    And that situation looks exactly like bi-directional causation and intention. But it also bounds the limits of intentionality to the patterns possible from that system’s set of physical interactions. So that if a system can produce the right patterns, it will also produce corresponding physical activity. And if the system is configured in a specific way, when certain physical activity occurs, the system will produce specific patterns. And if the system is perturbed (as in brain damage) it impairs the instantiation effect. But if the system is enhanced (as with learning or drugs) the system develops new or novel patterns and activities.

    It is not necessary to have a discussion of free-will in this kind of context. Free-will seems a bit non-sensical if the world itself is not extrinsically deterministic. The concept of free-will depends on the concept of determinism. The interesting question is not to describe how the mechanism we call free-will operates, but is instead to ask: How can we develop better pattern formations that produce better phsyical activity from our systems that instantiate these pattern/action side-effects? “How do we ideate and improvise new behavior?” is a much richer question space than wondering how free will operates (free will is an idea. How could it possibly operate in a determinstic physical (not idea) environment?)

    The world is more coherent when seen as the product of intrinsic forces expressed in the physical particles themselves. Intrinsic functionality is just a less familiar point of view. And it does not carry the complexity and contradictions that determinism necessarily entails (occam’s razor).

  3. Hi Peter,

    Good points all, and I’m sympathetic towards compatibilism, but I think you’ve skipped over a couple of important points the free will denier might want to make.

    Firstly, a computer program that makes “decisions” based on inputs and a simple algorithm is free in the sense that you describe, in that the constraints that determine its choice are largely internal, and it doesn’t have a gun to its head. But it seems wrong to describe it as free. So it seems that freedom requires something more.

    Secondly, consider the (real) case of a previously healthy and normal man who became a compulsive paedophile only after having sustained brain damage (a brain tumour I think). We might be inclined to forgive him and see him as sick rather than immoral, and attribute his behaviour to an impairment affecting (among other things) his capacity for freedom. But really the only difference between this man and a more run-of-the-mill paedophile is that we can point to a specific injury as a cause of his behaviour, whereas the behaviour of the ordinary paedophile is more mysterious and less understood.

    In both cases, the more we understand the internal processes and constraints leading to a choice, the less we are inclined to describe it as free, and the more mysterious it is the more it feels right to call it free. But if freedom really is a property of an agent rather than being all in the mind of the beholder, then there must be something wrong with this intuition. Some would say this means we should do away with the intuition of free will altogether.

    I have sympathy with that view too. So while I’m OK with both compatibilism and incompatibilist determinism as equally legitimate ways of looking at the same state of affairs, I think each camp would do well to respect the other as having a justifiable basis.

  4. Hi Calvin,

    I’d like to do your post justice, but it seems to be littered with assertions that I flatly disagree with, so your argument doesn’t hang together at all from my perspective. I realise that I’m just going to respond with assertions of my own, but I think we’ll get too far into the weeds if we try to debate each one.

    But I think I’ll give some examples of the assertions I’m talking about to show how your argument may not be all that persuasive to those who don’t already agree with you.

    First of all, my own view is the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH). I don’t want to defend it here, I just offer it as an example of a view which is utterly incompatible with your assertions. The MUH holds that mathematical Platonism is true, that some mathematical structures are complex and hospitable enough to host within them conscious observers, and that our universe is such a structure. On this view, the laws of nature just are the universe, and the atoms and molecules of our universe only exist as artifacts of those laws, much as the atoms and molecules of a simulated universe only exist as artifacts of the algorithm describing the simulation. They seem physical to us only because we are made of them and are part of the same structure as we are. There is no determiner of the laws — it is just that all possible mathematical structures are deemed to exist, and the laws of our universe constitute one such structure.

    > In short, if the universe is deterministic, it requires a determiner mechanism.

    I don’t accept this. If all possible universes exist, then nothing determines which ones exist and which do not because this distinction does not arise.

    > The deterministic viewpoint requires that the laws which govern phsyical phenomena be extrinsic to the physical phenomena.

    No it doesn’t, not necessarily. Not if the laws just are the universe.

    > But atoms and molecules are not components of algorithms.

    Maybe atoms and molecules emerge as a consequence of physical law. Which I guess would make them “components of algorithms”.

    > the deterministic viewpoint also becomes contradictory. The example of this is when a programmer of a video game tries to imbue their non-player characters with this mechanism we call “free will”. And no one has even the least inkling how.

    That we don’t know how to do something is not evidence of a contradiction. And I deny that “free will” is a discrete thing. It’s just very complex (and so unpredictable for practical purposes) mechanistic decision-making. On my view (and I recognise you will not accept it) Alpha Go may be considered to have “free will” in this sense.

    > Which means there must also be a mechanism which allows the non-physical features of consciousness to interact with and affect the physical phenomena of electrons, atoms and molecules.

    There is no need for such a mechanism. Software is not physical either, but we don’t need to posit any mysterious mechanism by which software interacts with hardware. Software supervenes on hardware and exists at a higher level of abstraction. Same with consciousness.

    > Physical determinism contradicts the possiblity of non-physical phenomena like qualia and ideas.

    So, no, it doesn’t, any more than it contradicts the possibility of non-physical phenomena like complexity or recursion or modularity in software design.

  5. It all depends what is meant by meta physical…

    …Could mind body be two interacting states determined to interact with a third state…

  6. I almost agree. But rather than one pseudo-problem, the “problem” of free will is several. One of the biggest strands is the intuitive (mis)understanding of causality, which calvin touches on. (FWIW I think his intrinsic property based interaction theory counts as “determinism” in the usual philosophical jargon, but it *is* importantly different from the God-the-lawgiver conception.)

    My take on this is identical to Carl Hoefer’s in his Stanford Encyc. article on causal determinism. The intuitive idea of causation is time-asymmetric in the following sense. We tend to think that no matter what happens now or in the future, the past would be the same. Then the incompatibilist comes along and says, “aha, the past is fixed! So if the past causally determines the future, the future is fixed too!” And then we start worrying about determinism, hoping it’s not true.

    But actual science – Schrodinger’s equation for example – is time-symmetric. All times sink or swim together, so to speak; the past is just as counterfactually dependent on the present as the future is. The fixity of the past is a cognitive illusion, induced by the fact that we generally only care about macroscopic events, where entropy is definable and a one:many relationship typically exists in the past-to-future direction only.

    Indeed, this one:many relationship among the event types we care about is the very reason we tend to think that our world is indeterministic. The incompatibilist is trying to rely on our continued allegiance to intuitions about time and causality that rested on the seeming indeterminism of layman-observable events. It’s a self defeating argument.

  7. Peter,
    Now suppose there is no plausible explanation of the origin of human intelligence and consciousness. I’ve got a big problem with Darwinism. I Believe evolutionary theory has not explained the origin of behavior, much less consciousness. Most of it’s efforts in this regard beg the question. Now what is a poor skeptic to do? Until life is explained, I’m not gonna be buffaloed. I do admit to be daunted by AI.

  8. It’s all in the definitions. (I realize that could be said of just about any philosophical discussion, but it seems especially true for this subject.)

    My compatibilist take is that the mind exists in this universe and its operations unroll according to the laws of physics (whether ultimately deterministic or not), but that social responsibility remains a coherent and useful concept. Determinism, if true, doesn’t negate that. Indeed, moral instruction and punishment deterrence seems pointless without it.

  9. Hey Disagreeable, thanks for the reply.

    I am making an argument against the perspective that the physical universe is extrinsically deterministic according to rules or laws. (including the rule of previously existing causes). I am not making an argument about whether people believe it is deterministic. What I attempted to show was how determinism functions necessarily leads to contradictions.

    Any deterministic environment requires that the determined phenomena behave according to some extrinsic rule or operand applied to that environment. It is the fact there is a rule which is problematic. Even intrinsic “determinism” introduces problematic complexity.

    A cellular automata is an extrinsic system, which performs a local function of an extrinsic rule. This application can produce non-deterministic phenomena, such as Wolfram’s cellular automata rule 30. In this scenario, the mechanism of applying the rules locally leads to a non-deterministic result. Which violates the larger perspective that the physical world itself is determinstic.

    Moreover, we know our world produces many non-determinstic phenomena, Radioactive decay is a strong example.

    To produce the variety of phenomena we see in our physical universe – according to determined rules – requires a mechanism which performs the functions which express the rules. If there is no mechanism, how does the determined phenomena occur? In a cellualr automata or computer simulation it is the computers operation which performs the function of a rule. In the physical world, we do not observe a machine which performs the code to make our phsyical universe operate the way it does.

    What my argument was meant to elicit was an understanding that the perspective of determinism requires an extrinsic function to enforce deterministic rules. And this complication makes determinsim a perspective that is fraught with complexity and contradictions – in it’s application. But not as a matter of belief. It is fairly easy for humans to believe in extrinsic determinsim.

    There is another view, that the physical universe is not deterministic, there there are no extrinsic rules and that all mechanisms of causation occur from the inside out. That is causation arises from the particles themselves which are the constituent components of the physical universe. This is the prevailing view in physics.

    From this perspective, all causal phenomena occur at the level of particle interactions. Macro level events are aggregations of underlying particle phenomena and particle induced causation. In fact, macro level events are not regulated by extrinsic rules at all. It appears that rules or laws govern macro phenomena because we observe regularity in macro events. But this is a side-effect of a mass of underlying micro causal phenomena.

    The notion of intrinsic causation (produced by particles) vs. extrinsic causation (produced by rules) is a fairly recent perspective about the physical universe. Intrinsic causation vs extrinsic determinism appears to be harder for humans to believe. Perhaps one reason why is that our languages are imbued with the assumption of extrinsic causation. But intrinsic causation is a much less complicated perspective in explaining how phenomena of the physical universe occur.

    Your reply illustrates the added complexity extrinsic determinism elicts.
    “If all possible universes exist, then nothing determines which ones exist …”
    “Maybe atoms and molecules emerge as a consequence of physical law.
    “Alpha Go may be considered to have “free will” in this sense.”
    “Software supervenes on hardware and exists at a higher level of abstraction. Same with consciousness.”

    “If, Maybe, Sense, Supervene” are suggestions meant to try to retain the perspective of a rule based determinism But these all add complexity. They are suggestions of WHAT may be happening in our universe (if it’s determinstic) but not HOW phenomena happen – regardless of whether it’s deterministic or not. (Occam’s razor!)

    And here where you write: “free will” is a … very complex … mechanistic decision-making” function (sic) Illustrates the implicit contradiction. One the one hand in a determinstic system, free-will MUST be a function. So what causes the function of free will? What causes the mechanistic decision-making process which can generate choices? Where is the rule for the free-will process? And on the other hand, mechanistic systems do not and cannot make choices – they are mechanistic, not adaptive, and not free to perform non-mechanistic actions.

    We apprehend the difference between mechanistic and non-mechanistic phenomena. A mechanistic system cannot apprehend a non-mechanistic phenomena. what mechanism could a mechanistic system even use to encode non-mechanistic information? It is only programmers that can encode representations of non-mechanistic phenomena in a mechanistic system.

    Mechanistic and formal systems (like extrinsic determinstic systems) contain inherent limits that prevent them from being capable of capturing the full range of phenomena we experience. (see Godel, Turing, Searle).

    I sincerely appreciate the sensibility that our world has rules which determine it’s operation. That perspective has served our species very well for thousands of years. But that perspective breaks down when trying to describe how such a system actually works. It especially breaks when including the phenomena of experience (such as qualia and ideas). Extrinsic and syntactic systems cannot work when trying to develop a computer system that could have free-will or consciousness. Extrinsic funtionality itself leads to contradictions that prevent phenomena such as qualia, ideation, and intentionality from occurring. And because we know qualia, ideation, and intentionality occur, extrinsic deterministic functions must not be how our physical world operates.

    But, instead of arguing about what we believe, it would be much more fun to code a system which has intentionality or experiences qualia. And a discussion of a process which could do that would likely be much more productive.

    Consider this experimental problem: How could you get a computer system to see magenta from RGB inputs? And if you can get it to do that, could you get the computer to dream, wherein it sees something magenta without RGB inputs? And could you get it to initiate a sensible, but uncoded action from it’s dream of magenta?

    What I found working on this problem, is that I could either encode magenta in some way, making the representation of magenta mechanistic, and hence not an experience of magenta at all. Or there must be some other way to produce qualia which is not mechanistic. This slowly led me to realize that extrinsic syntactic mechanisms cannot produce experiential phenomena at all. (Searle is right. Many people just give up working on these kinds of problems, but continue to believe that deterministic or mechanistic processes can, someday, produce qualia without being able to explain how.)

    I would be curious to know you would do this experiment.

  10. Hey Disagreeable Me,

    I wanted to take one particular point you brought up that is a great example of the problem of deterministic systems.

    “…Alpha Go may be considered to have “free will” in this sense.”

    Can Alpha Go choose to lose games? Can Alpha Go intentionally lose or intentionally not play?

    And the answer of course is no.

    Mechanistic systems, regardless of how they are constructed, do not have intentions. And they especially do not have intentions or perceptions of their own functionality. How could Google or IBM code a game which could lose? Do you see how non-sensical that kind of activity would be? But it’s not non-sensical behavior for humans. How could Google code Alpha Go so it could choose to lose, but just barely?

    If a computer system has free-will it should be able to do the opposite of what it’s programmed to do. And it should be able to choose to do some range of behaviors between it’s explicit program and the implicit possibility of choosing the opposite. Do you see how this is a problem for determinism itself as a mechanism of causation?

  11. Questioning free-will relatively to the determinism of matter clearly highlights some incompatibilities. But I feel that such a starting point skips the level of life where characteristics and performances should be taken into account as providing a much simpler intermediate step (no self-consciousness).
    Locality and autonomy are some of these characteristics.
    The reign of determinism on matter is an ubiquist event. Natural laws apply everywhere. But life is a local event. A paramecium getting away from acid water obeys a local “stay alive” constraint which is internal to the paramecium and does not apply to the water surrounding her (sorry for repeating…). The locality of these constraint (internal to the entity) came up with life in the evolution of our universe, and of course apply to us humans (with specific constraints). So evolution allows to position locality as a first characteristic that differentiates free will from determinism.
    Another characteristic of life is the performance of autonomy that came up between matter and humans. And it may have a role in an evolutionary nature of free-will. Perhaps something like free-will=animal autonomy+ self-consciousness (kind of human “conscious autonomy”)
    But it is difficult to go further as the nature of autonomy is still to be understood.
    Overall I feel that the analysis of the mysterious characteristics of our human mind should begin by looking at how they could be linked to animal performances (ex: intentionality where there may be a lot to get from formalizing a bio-intentionality).

  12. Thanks calvin for your comments, you basically summed up my own vision in a way that a non native english speaker like me could not have done by himself.

  13. Hi Calvin,

    I understand you are making an argument against determinism and not against the fact that many people seem to be determinists. However the argument you make rests on assumptions and assertions that many (including me) will reject, and so it will be unpersuasive to those people.

    I reject the dichotomy you draw between extrinsic determinism and intrinsic determinism, (if I understand it correctly — and I’m not sure that I do). As long as all empirical facts are the same, I do not think there is a difference between external laws controlling how objects behave, and those objects having an intrinsic nature that gives rise to behaviour describable as lawful. To me, and again with the caveat that there are no empirical differences, these are just two different ways of describing the same state of affairs. Without an empirical difference there is indeed no difference. A universe where causal interaction arises at the particle level and where particles behave predictably and lawfully is a deterministic universe — although given the apparent randomness of QM it is only strictly deterministic under one of the deterministic interpretations of QM.

    In any case, I would reject talk of extrinsic rules and I see the laws of the universe as intrinsic to the universe and the particles as artifacts of those laws.

    > It is the fact there is a rule which is problematic.

    I don’t see it as a problem. I see it as necessary.

    > A cellular automata is an extrinsic system, which performs a local function of an extrinsic rule.

    I don’t follow.

    > This application can produce non-deterministic phenomena, such as Wolfram’s cellular automata rule 30.

    Rule 30 is perfectly deterministic. It’s aperiodic and chaotic, which is not the same thing as non-deterministic.

    > Moreover, we know our world produces many non-determinstic phenomena, Radioactive decay is a strong example.

    We don’t know that radioactive decay is non-deterministic. There are coherent deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics which are consistent with all empirical results, e.g. the Many Worlds Interpretation, which holds that all possibilities are realised, and so any apparent indeterminism is an artifact of our being only to observe any one particular outcome.

    > If there is no mechanism, how does the determined phenomena occur?

    I reject the assertion that a mechanism is required. A mechanism is required in a computer simulation, true, but it does not follow necessarily that a mechanism is required in the physical universe. Analogies are helpful rhetorical or didactic devices but pretty weak evidence for a contentious position. You’ll get different answers to your questions from others, but on my view (the MUH), the universe is an abstract mathematical object, and like any mathematical object it needs no mechanism to sustain itself. An abstract cellular automaton may have rules and behaviours and objects within it we can explore by simulating it with a mechanism, but (at least on Platonism) those behaviours etc are there to find whether or not we bother to do so. The mechanism is needed to support our exploration of these objects from without, but not to sustain their independent existence as abstract mathematical objects.

    I don’t see how using words such as “If, Maybe, Sense, Supervene” violates Occam’s razor. Being more assertive does not mean you are being more parsimonious.

    You say that mechanistic free will is an oxymoron, because mechanisms can’t make choices. But surely you are aware of compatibilism, and for me the only free will is the compatibilist sort, which gives a mechanistic account of choice. Nothing “causes” the function of free will. For me, “free will” is just a label we give to the very complex and often unpredictable yet mechanistic decision-making undertaken by humans. To me, there is nothing qualitatively different between this and decisions made by a sophisticated algorithm.

    > We apprehend the difference between mechanistic and non-mechanistic phenomena

    I don’t, as I think all phenomena are ultimately mechanistic. The difference you perceive is between phenomena where you have a rough grasp of the underlying mechanisms and phenomena where you don’t.

    > Extrinsic and syntactic systems cannot work when trying to develop a computer system that could have free-will or consciousness

    Disagree.

    > Extrinsic funtionality itself leads to contradictions that prevent phenomena such as qualia, ideation, and intentionality from occurring.

    Disagree. Either these phenomena don’t exist (qualia, per Dennett) or they’re just intuitive ways of talking about ultimately mechanistic processes (intentionality).

    > How could you get a computer system to see magenta from RGB inputs?

    Depends what you mean by “see”. And all the other terms you use in the ensuing paragraph. If you want a computer to have as rich a relationship with magenta as you do, then it would need to be programmed to emulate something like a human brain. But I think trying to understand how to reproduce qualia mechanistically is the wrong question, because I think qualia don’t exist. To mimic a human brain, what you actually need to do is make a system which is under the (arguably mistaken or illusory) impression that it experiences qualia.

    > If a computer system has free-will it should be able to do the opposite of what it’s programmed to do.

    No. Everything does what it is built to do, including humans. Alpha Go cannot choose to lose in a game of Go to you, but neither can you choose to beat Alpha Go. You are limited by your capabilities and Alpha Go is limited by its capabilities. You have the capability to intentionally throw a game, Alpha Go does not. It has the capability to play Go at a level beyond any human, you do not. The option to lose a game was not made available to Alpha Go when it was constructed — it is not in the space of decisions it is choosing from. The space of decisions you can choose from is much broader than the space of decisions Alpha Go is choosing from, but it is still limited. It may appear broader than it actually is. You may have the illusion that you could suddenly strip off your clothes and run naked through the streets for no apparent reason, but for most people that choice isn’t actually available to them — it’s something they would simply never do.

  14. Thanks for responding Disagreeable Me,

    You said:

    >But I think trying to understand how to reproduce qualia mechanistically is the wrong question, because I think qualia don’t exist.

    I am curious to know what facts lead you to this belief? What facts can you share with me, that suggest or imply to you that qualia do not exist? I don’t mean why qualia may violate a theory like determinism. I would like to know what facts exist – regardless of theories – which suggest that qualia phenomena do not exist?

    I understand that some theories that describe the natural world require qualia to be illusions. (such as Dennett style materialism) but what I am curious to know is what stand alone facts, we both can point to which suggest qualia do not exist?

    If you mean that qualia are illusions, then you agree that qualia exist. But illusions are explicitly non-physical phenomena – they do not exist physically – but they do exist and we experience them. So suggesting qualia are illusions requires an explanation for how deterministic rules control physical objects to produce non-physical illusions. And it requires an explanation for how physical phenomena are affected when we respond to illusions.

    A fact I will offer is that we can both see magenta (some color blindnesses would affect this). And I know you assert that magenta is not a qualia (because there are no such things as qualia). So, what is magenta composed of? Magenta does not occur in the color spectrum so it cannot be solely composed of photons.
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visible_spectrum

    What determines that violet and red light should be seen as magenta? And why should green after images be magenta?
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afterimage

    Why experience magenta and not nothing? or both red and blue colors? or some other color?

    You might argue that colors are representational phenomena, but what physical facts _determine_ which particular colors? How can the matter which generates the colors perceive the representation? I’ll grant there might be a pattern which emerges in neural activity, when both red and blue cone cells slow the release of glutamate, which produces excitation in the surround cells. And that the excited cells then initiate patterns that flow through the optic nerve to the visual cortex (like a glider in Conway’s game of life). But patterns are not colors. (dream colors cannot be physical phenomena so that needs a deterministic explanation as well.)

    Also, determinism as a theory is a kind of content of experience. Theories are not physical. Yet you have a feeling that determinism must be correct. Can you describe the feeling you have about the theory using quantitative physical phenomena only? How do feelings related to the concept of determinism itself occur if the feelings do not exist? Or, if the feeling determinism is true is an illusion, it is an illusion of what?

    you may respond that a theory-of-determinism is a special kind of physical object, but if that is the case, what matter are theories composed of? what particles compose a theory-of-determinism? Why make that argument? What observable facts lead you to that conclusion?

    I suspect the reason you made the argument that qualia do not exist or that “atoms and molecules emerge as a consequence of physical law” is because qualia cannot exist as a condition of determinism being true.

    However, if phenomena are experienced, that is sufficient to assert the phenomena exists. A phenomena may not be what we think it is, but it’s existence is not in question. eg. the sun does not set, but sunsets are real phenomena. Even dream sunsets occur, even though no actual suns are involved in dreams at all.

    The stand alone facts suggest that ideas and qualia phenomena exist but that they are non physical. Meaning they are NOT composed of molecules and particles. Yet somehow the molecules and particles interact with the non-physical phenomena within us – within our brains.

    It is much simpler to assert that there are real things like ideas, experiences, qualia – representational phenomena – which exist.
    And there are physical phenomena composed of particles and molecules which interact because of their intrinsic causal forces.
    And that molecules and particle interactions are not representational phenomena and vice versa.
    And that these two different kinds of phenomena interact in complex physical systems like nervous systems and these interactions are what we refer to as features of consciousness – perception, intentionality, meaning, qualia, etc.

    To the best of my knowledge there are no facts which contradict these assertions. I would be happy to know of some facts which do.

    For argument sake, let’s grant these 5 assertions are true.

    > ” I do not think there is a difference between external laws controlling how objects behave, and those objects having an intrinsic nature that gives rise to behavior describable as lawful.”

    If we assert that determinism is the means by which the physical phenomena behave, then we have to explain how the non-physical phenomena interact with the deterministic process which is “controlling how objects behave”. Or we have to assert that non-physical phenomena do not exist (contrary to our direct experience). Or we have to assert that non-physical phenomena are somehow a kind of matter or matter is a kind of idea. Or assert non-physical phenomena are illusions, leading to ask how determinism creates non-physical illusions. Or assert special forces like supervenience let non-physical phenomena affect molecules. Or special conditions like “many worlds” to describe how choices affect physical outcomes that produce many worlds that we endlessly generate. The assertion of determinism drives us to make additional assertions.

    Determinism simply adds complexity. At a minimum, it adds the assertion that how objects behave is determined. It looks very similar to intrinsic causation, but it is not the same. The extra complexity is not necessary.

    The behavior of objects – the patterns of physical phenomena – can be produced by intrinsic causation as side-effects of the intrinsic causal interaction of particles – no determinism needed. side-effects, not determined effects.

    We are still left with the problem of how non-physical -representational- phenomena interact with molecules and particles in brains. But we have that problem with determinism as well. So dropping determinism does not change the technical problems.

    Abandoning determinism does free us from a whole host of theoretical problems. We do not have to figure out how to interface the representational phenomena to the “external laws controlling how objects behave”. And we do not have to describe whether the external laws themselves are representational phenomena or physical phenomena or something else entirely. And we do not have to figure out how the external laws control the behavior of objects. Or whether there is a secondary deterministic law (free-will) which comes into force when representational phenomena cause physical events in the body.

    I understand that dropping determinism is a challenging proposition. It goes against so much of human thought it seems rather insane. But that sensibility does not change the fact determinism adds complexity to the discussion of physical phenomena and the phenomena of consciousness. Occam’s razor indicates we should drop it. And while I appreciate your argments against what I am suggesting, you have not made the counter argument that determinism (extrinsic rules which control physical causation) is simpler than the a-deterministic alternative of intrinsic causation alone.

    I want to point out something interesting. Theories of determinism arise in conversations involving consciousness but they do not arise in discussions of physics. As a general rule, no one in physics cares about determinism. They care about causation. And all the evidence of physics shows that causal forces are intrinsic to particles. The causal forces are not extrinsic to external laws which control the particles. Adding determinism to physical descriptions does not improve our ability to describe physical phenomena. It obscures how bottom up or intrinsic causation operates to produce the kinds of phenomena we observe.

    I had wanted to respond to your Alpha Go/Naked argument and how the problems you bring up are elucidated in the game simon-says. And how programming a machine to play simon-says is impossible because playing the game actually requires machine consciousness. Syntactic (rule based or machine learning ) system cannot apprehend the essence of the game, which is that being tricked to move is how the game is won(or lost). And how a computer could never know it was tricked. That any deterministic system could never apprehend when it loses (otherwise it would make a different response action ). But, i’ve already written too much; maybe later.

    Thank you for responses.

  15. Is determinism, a means-oneself-searching, for the will to be free…
    …that will could be a matter for feeling free…

  16. Hi Calvin,

    I think we’re drifting too off topic and monopolising the conversation here. My main purpose was just to point out that you’re relying on a lot of contestable assertions for your argument, not to make a positive case for my own view.

    But I’d be happy to continue the conversation privately if you wish. You can contact me via the contact form on my blog if you would like to do that.

  17. I agree with Peter’s analysis and would add that discussions of free will smuggle in ‘I’ as the owner of free will, without making explicit what that is. To me, it is everything going on with the boundary of my body, including all the physics. That means it’s describing a composite object, something which physics isn’t very good at, even if physical principles are not violated. If you look more closely at what it would mean to use physics to account for everything making up the body, as distinct from everything outside, and then about what causes what across the boundary conditions between the the body and the outside world, some quite interesting stuff comes out of it.

  18. A couple of comments…

    Calvin asserts that there is a difference between non-physical and physical phenomena, but I cannot think of a single non-physical phenomena that doesn’t have a physical substrate. Every thought in your head requires neurons to be firing in a particular way. Without a physical substrate a non-physical phenomena does not exist.

    Peter just defines free will as decisions made without external influence and ignores the whole problem of whether your consciousness was arrived at in a deterministic manner.

    For me, the issue is whether our rock solid knowledge of behaviour of elementary particles results in a causal chain that precisely determines what I am doing and thinking right now or whether there is something that weakens this linkage so that there are many possible outcomes, excluding randomness.

  19. I don’t think it’s all in the definitions. People had a sense of free will, of being able to choose anything and such like.

    Replacing this feeling with ‘Well, you just don’t know all the billions of deterministic factors involved…that sense of freedom comes from ignorance of the determinism that then forms how you act (an ignorance that is probably impossible to entirely avoid even for a super AI).

    I mean, it’s like saying if you discover you were adopted, that’s just a matter of definitions. But seriously, a game changer like that is not just a matter of definitions! It’s a very difficult personal change in how you understand yourself.

  20. Nice post and discussion. I have several questions, but I’ll focus on one, causality. As I see it, everyday use of the term, and legal use of the term, falls in 2 categories: 1. Physical causality. 2. Motivational (or behavioral) causality. Example of #1: billiard ball collisions. Example of #2. Anger in person A caused him to hit person B.

    I just served on a jury where the both were at issue. What physical events caused the damage to the plaintif? (In this case, both sides agreed that more than 2 hours of unrelieved pressure caused the damage). Second, did negligence by the nursing staff cause the damage?

    Clearly, one can argue that motivational causality is due to physical causes, but not how we treat it in convention or the law.

  21. Peter

    Nice post. I have to say there are two clearly distinct concepts here : determinism, whose meaning is very clear, and free will, who’s meaning is only really clear unless we assume it means that thinking is not determined.

    I will start by saying straight off the biggest nonsense of all, true to the Dennett legacy, is compatibilism. You cant be deterministic and undeterministic at the same time. You can’t assume that if the universe at time T determines the universe at time (T + d), then a man can ‘duck’ to avoid a ball. Determinst physics doesnt recognise verbs and agency and using them implies an acceptance of ‘free will’. A person and an intransitive verb in the same sentence can only come from the mouth of a free will believer, or indeterminist.

    Moving on from compatibilism which is not very helpful to anybody, the only answer that seems to me to make sense is to accept that human cognition can only produce determinst models of physical pictures, and can only produce agency based models of human pictures. It’s a cognitive limit of the species and is perhaps made more acceptable by the fact that physics can’t predict mental events – thus the two can be readily and coherently be said to not contradict each other.

    Jbd

  22. Been reading an article in Scientific American, July 2017, about the possible interactions of dark matter, light matter and black holes, at big bang and now, via astronomy, perhaps inferring I am here/determined within limits of a known universe…

    That with a telescope I see life exist in time and space, with the same seeing I see my life has a place there-here too…
    …That free will is toward seeing our interactions now…I think Socrates would like this…

  23. Hi Stephen,

    you said:

    > “I cannot think of a single non-physical phenomena that doesn’t have a physical substrate. Every thought in your head requires neurons to be firing in a particular way. Without a physical substrate a non-physical phenomena does not exist.”

    Can you tell me why you think this?

    I find many people want to reduce ideas to a physics but I do not think that reduction is possible. And I don’t see how physical phenomena can generate ideas (any more than seeing how ideas could generate particles.) I don’t disagree that ideas are instantiated or represented with molecules. but I do not think ideas are reducible to molecules.

    In particular can you tell me what a physical substrate is for the following things?

    The set of prime numbers, Pi, and Imaginary numbers like the square root of -1.

    I have a particular model problem I use related to this question called the Calculator Problem. If I do a computation on a pentium computer that calculates 67+43 and I do the same calculation on a solar powered calculator, if the machines are built correctly (Pentium!), then I will get the same answer. But the machines will use physically different structures to do the computation. they will use different gate structures and voltages for instance. but the representational process of addition will be the same for both systems – even though neither one actually knows what addition is, or what numbers are.

    Now consider two human beings: you and a citizen of Rome circa 75bc. You both can calculate 67+43. Which in theory means that both your brains have been configured in a way to perform the same abstract calculation process as the calculator and computer. And that after calculation the result is somehow presented to consciousness.

    but it’s impossible that your brain and the Roman’s brain neurons are configured in exactly the same way. Under the microscope the everyones neurons make unique webs of connections. Yet somehow everyone’s brains can be configured to perform calculations. This variation of wiring reflects how a calculator and a pentium computer will have different wiring.

    Now if I ask: “what is 43-67?” you can give me an answer. But if I ask the Roman, he will say there is no such thing! But of course the answer is -24, even if the Roman cannot calculate that.

    One part of the Calculator Problem is: how does the brain wire itself to do calculations? And importantly, the molecules and neurons of the brain do not know what correct or incorrect calculations are. The same is true for the Pentium computer chip. Particles and molecules cannot know what is a correct calculation. So how can the neurons wire up to produce correct calculations? The Roman just proves the deeper point that you can have an idea such as negative numbers -which exists- but which has no physical substrate that we know of. Whether negative numbers exist or not, is not determined by whether there is a substrate that instantiates the idea. 0 and negative numbers did not come into existence upon their ….discovery. they are ideas that exist regardless of if they known.

    An example of free will is where we can choose to do a calculation when presented with numbers. A pentium computer cannot avoid doing a calculation. We can. Which means that we are free to present the number abstractions to the calculation processes our brain wires up to perform. A calculator is not free, because it is not in fact being presented with an idea, it is having it’s buttons pressed in a certain order that will cause the calculation to occur – no ideas about numbers necessary. Free will only comes into play at the interface between the non-physical representations and the physical molecules.

  24. John,

    A person and an intransitive verb in the same sentence can only come from the mouth of a free will believer, or indeterminist.

    This is no more the case than an evolutionary scientist using the word ‘design’ must mean he believes in some kind of god being involved. If you want to say a determinist can’t use your words, that’s one thing. But dictating what someones belief is by use of a single word…seriously?

    The practice of physics can’t predict the weather perfectly – it doesn’t mean the weather contains some element beyond physics. The practice of physics can’t predict every little function in a human brain, that doesn’t mean the brain and the things that brain utters about itself are beyond physics.

  25. Callan

    You are msconstruing my comments as prohibitive or censorious, which they’re not. They simply point out thay folk language use in this particular scenario – compatibilism- makes the argument contradictory.

    I was referring to Dennett who, in drawing his theory, echoes the line that the universe is determinist – fine – but then usually says something about a man (or robot) ‘ducking’ out if the way of a ball.

    A man in other words who is using voluntary action to intervene in the flow of events. Not possible – if you claim that determinism is true – because determinism says that only the current state of the universe, plus the laws of physics, can determine the next state. Men don’t duck out of the way in a determined universe. It is a verbless world. And that really is the end of it.

    My guess is that compatibilism comes out of computationalists with liberal leanings. They want accountability – they want verbs – but they want queen physics to rule the universe with an iron rod too. They want to have their cake and eat it, in other words. Well, you can’t. It reminds me of the solipsist who wrote to Bertrand Russell. “Noone understands me”, she said.

    Jbd

  26. Calvin – 23

    I think the quote you provided is a pretty clear explanation of why I think this way. In other words, if you remove the physical portion of a thought, the thought no longer exists.

    The physical substrate of something like the set of prime numbers can be in a few places. When I was a toddler, I had no concept of the set of prime numbers and it had no physical instantiation in my brain. When a teacher taught it to me or I saw it in a textbook (both examples of a physical existence, one in the teacher’s brain and one in the letters of the textbook) it took on a physical presence in my brain in whatever manner new knowledge gets incorporated into our brains. It isn’t a concept that just amorphously floats around in the ether. Something like the concept of prime numbers is firmly instantiated in many minds and texts, but that general knowledge of the topic doesn’t make it disconnected from it’s physical realities.

    You commented: “how does the brain wire itself to do calculations? And importantly, the molecules and neurons of the brain do not know what correct or incorrect calculations are. The same is true for the Pentium computer chip. Particles and molecules cannot know what is a correct calculation. So how can the neurons wire up to produce correct calculations?”

    The answer is that particles and molecules don’t know how to calculate. It is the organization of those things into neurons and the organization of the neurons into brains that allows the calculation to take place. Or in the case of the computer, the organization of the molecules into transistors and the connection of those transistors into organized gates and arrays that allows it to do computations. Try those calculations in your head without using any neurons!

    You commented: “An example of free will is where we can choose to do a calculation when presented with numbers. A pentium computer cannot avoid doing a calculation. We can. Which means that we are free to present the number abstractions to the calculation processes our brain wires up to perform.”

    The determinist would say that it was inevitable that you would choose to do the calculation. You choice is driven by the physical operation of your brain. The only reason it seems like free will is that the complexity is so huge you can’t see the connections.

    So I’m back to where I started, which is: Is there a good argument against determinism? It really doesn’t seem like it could be true, but that is a rather poor argument to make.

  27. Stephen

    Is there a good argument against determinism?

    Yes – the question. Determinism doesn’t recognise arguments, as persuasion is a nullity in the determined flow of matter. Yet – you seem to see the value in it. Furthermore there is nothing in the laws of physics that will predict, or have value, or connection, or emergence, the very idea of an argument in the first place. Physics is particles in motion – that’s it.

    Regs
    JBD

  28. John – 27

    Determinists would say the question is just a result of the causal behaviour of particles. I can’t buy into the argument that simply disconnects the physical laws from the higher order behaviour of organized particles. After all, what are we except a big pile of particles? If there is an answer, it has to be more than that.

  29. Stephen,

    I chose these examples because they cannot be instantiated physically. The set of prime numbers, Pi, and Imaginary numbers like the square root of -1 are mathematical concepts. Pi and the set of prime numbers involve infinities. This means to instantiate them would require an infinite amount of physical matter to form an actual instantiation. And given what we know about infinities, we know that some infinities are greater infinities than other infinities. Which means that even if we could physically instantiate the set of primes, we could not instantiate the set of real numbers.

    This physical limit of infinite instantiation is a boundary for our own bodies. There are not enough molecules in our nervous system to instantiate the set of prime numbers. So what we must be doing is creating a representation of infinities. That representation, as generated in our brain, is simultaneously a physical phenomena composed of molecules and a representational phenomena which is an idea. The argument I am making is that the set of prime number is an actual thing, but it cannot ever be a physical thing. Can you show how the set of primes is or could be a physical thing?

    Further, there are no causal forces that would make molecules or neurons represent something beyond the bounds of physical reality, like an infinite set of numbers. How can any configuration of molecules know about an infinite set? How could it interact with that extra-physical content to know if it is a valid representation?

    You wrote: “The determinist would say that it was inevitable that you would choose to do the calculation.”

    But these arguments by determinists are all experimentally crap. What humans can do that mechanisms of all kinds cannot do, is that humans can choose not to act. humans can do the opposite. No determinist can construct an experiment demonstrating that free will is deterministic, that a belligerent snarky 14 year old couldn’t figure out a way to demolish.

    The 14yr old human can make intentional and unintentional errors. No mechanism can make an kind of error. It’s physically impossible for a mechanism to make errors. An error is an idea. it is a representation about what a mechanism is supposed to do but not what the mechanism actually does. Ideas have nothing to do with physics or mechanisms. Mechanisms, such as programs or calculations never make errors.

    I referenced the Pentium in my argument because of the famous Pentium Bug. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pentium_FDIV_bug A machine, like the Pentium returned incorrect floating point division results. The chip, operating system, and programs never knew of the incorrect division, because machines do not have ideas about what valid or invalid floating point division is. a machine is just a mechanism. Mechanism cannot have knowledge. Machines are deterministic.

    It was only human being who could identify that the pentium chip had a flaw. It is only human beings that can identify when they themselves have flaws in their thought process or make mistakes. As I argued earlier, it’s impossible to program a computer to play Simon Says, because the game is about making, recognizing, and avoiding errors. Machines cannot recognize errors.

    Determinism as a theory requires a deterministic process or force, or mechanism to exist if determinism is a coherent description of how the universe operates. Which means that if determinism actually worked, the force or mechanism of determinism would never produce an error. Which means a system, like a universe which functioned deterministically, could never have an idea about errors, or that errors exist – because errors couldn’t exist in such a universe. But we all know what errors are. We talk about them, we make them. Which means the universe cannot be deterministic… it just sort of looks that way from certain points of view.

    I am making a reductionist argument that our universe is composed of particles and the particles are the cause of physical forces and create matter. And there are representational phenomena, things like ideas,qualia, meanings. The representational phenomena are not physical and the physical phenomena are not representational. Errors are representational phenomena.

    I think I have proved that certain ideas could never be instantiatied physically, and hence there can be no physical substrate for those ideas. (the set of primes, natural numbers, and real numbers for instance). And there are many quantum physics experiments that prove determinism does not occur at the small scale. Which means the idea of determinism is only observed under certain conditions and is not a fact or force which determines how phenomena behave.

    When I asked ““how does the brain wire itself to do calculations?…” you answered “It is the organization of those things(molecules) into neurons and the organization of the neurons into brains that allows the calculation to take place.”

    and I agree with you whole heartedly!!!! That is and must be true. it is the organization of molecules into neurons and brain structures that allows us to calculate. That is WHAT must be happening.

    But that was not my question. My question was How? And the answer you imply is that the “how” must be determinism. But that simply cannot be the case as argued above. deterministic, syntactic, mechanistic processes cannot be affected by ideas, recognize semantics, or apprehend and respond to errors.

    What I’m curious to know is: why you resist the reduction that ideas are non physical phenomena?

    Because, if we accept that ideas and representations are non-physical then obviously it is WHERE ideas and physics interact where apparent non-deterministic phenomena should occur. Isn’t it interesting that it is only where ideas and physics interact that we see a phenomena like free will? (I don’t mean there is a force of free will, I mean an observation of an effect we call free-will.)

    Which leads to asking the obvious question from such a reduction: how do ideas and physics interact?

    How questions are more experimentally interesting. And theories of how something happens seem much more robust and falsifiable than theories of what is happening (eg determinism). And this is a serious question I would like to ask you. How would YOU falsify determinism?

  30. Stephen


    “Determinists would say the question is just a result of the causal behaviour of particles.”

    Trouble with that is the poverty of output (as opposed to the poverty of input). Determinism is based upon physics – matter in motion. That’s the extent of the semantic. You cannot go from quarks and meters per second to semantic notions like “ideas” – such as determinism, or physics, of free will. They are not necessarily incompatible with determinism, but physics alone cannot account for the idea of determinism.

    In fact physics alone can’t account for much. Humans, dogs, teeth – all these things have no meaning to physics. In order to use physics for humans and dogs we need to tell our physics models what a human is in the first place. Physics isn’t bright enough to
    know. With such a huge deficit in it’s explanatory capabilities, it may be sensible to allow the universe to be more flexible – or at least be sceptical that just because it’s what physics implies is necessary, that it need not be the case. Or, as I tend to think, it’s a biological cognitition issue that can’t be resolved.

    JBD

  31. John Davey – 30

    I wasn’t really thinking about physics, which is limited to the scientific study of particles and their behaviour. I was thinking about how everything is made from these particles and how there is, seemingly, a causal chain from them through to molecules, structures, cells, etc. to form things like brains or computer processors. After all, there are no thoughts without brains and no brains without elementary particles.

    Calvin – 29

    OK I see what you are saying about things like the set of prime numbers not being physically instantiated. The only problem is that I can’t see them being mentally instantiated either. I can’t even name all of the prime numbers. There is an infinite number of them. So what is instantiated? It is the concept of prime numbers and the calculation of some of them. Both the concept and the naming require a physical substrate to exist.

    “What humans can do that mechanisms of all kinds cannot do, is that humans can choose not to act. humans can do the opposite.”

    But why do you make that choice? Presumably whatever processed sensor input you have combines with whatever knowledge, habits, values, beliefs etc. you have at that moment to arrive at that decision. Where did all those things come from? It just keeps going.
    How do you know you could have made another choice when you have only one chance and can’t repeat the situation many times over?

    “It was only human being who could identify that the pentium chip had a flaw. It is only human beings that can identify when they themselves have flaws in their thought process or make mistakes. As I argued earlier, it’s impossible to program a computer to play Simon Says, because the game is about making, recognizing, and avoiding errors. Machines cannot recognize errors.”

    Well, I don’t believe that is true. Really, you are just talking about the capabilities of different machines. The Simon Says game is just a exploit on the limitations of the human machine. We are built with a lot of heuristic processes that allow us to process information with limited resources. They are easily compromised, hence all of the trickery with illusion drawings, masking experiments and unseen gorillas running across the stage. Computers have other vulnerabilities.

    Additionally, the abilities of man made machines keeps changing. The idea that machines could calculate numbers and keep accounts would have been considered preposterous some years ago, much less translating languages or driving cars. The only thing that seems fairly certain is that man made machine capabilities will keep increasing.

    The whole “a machine can only…” argument is unsustainable and seems based on a kind of human arrogance. It starts to fall apart when the machine gets too complicated to easily understand.

    “What I’m curious to know is: why you resist the reduction that ideas are non physical phenomena?”

    I think that is answered above.

    I can understand the determinist argument, even though I am agnostic on whether it is true or not. I feel that it isn’t, but that isn’t worth much. So I asked the question whether there was a good argument against determinism, but I haven’t seen it yet.

    I have no idea how to falsify determinism. I’ll have a think on that one. Maybe brighter minds than mine can answer it.

  32. John,

    You are msconstruing my comments as prohibitive or censorious, which they’re not. They simply point out thay folk language use in this particular scenario – compatibilism- makes the argument contradictory.

    If you’re going to insist on reading a folk language use in it, sure – but that’s prohibitive and censorious.

    My guess is that compatibilism comes out of computationalists with liberal leanings. They want accountability – they want verbs – but they want queen physics to rule the universe with an iron rod too. They want to have their cake and eat it, in other words. Well, you can’t.

    Okay, so evolutionary scientist use the word ‘design’ without somehow indicating they are subscribing to some god being behind the process. How do they have their cake and eat it too?

    To me it sounds much like arguing someone can’t be attracted to someone of the same sex because the word ‘gay’ means happy. If the person is gay though, the are – you can insist they can’t use X words to describe their orientation if you want. But trying to insist they are just saying they are happy when they say they are gay is just deliberately avoiding the point. Same goes for these verbs – if the universe is ruled by queen physics with an iron fist, it just is. Trying to say using these words somehow in some way means the universe isn’t ruled that way, it’s deliberately avoiding the point. No one really owns the word ‘gay’, so actually it can refer to homosexuality. Various verbs aren’t really owned by anybody, so they can be used in reference to a universe ruled by queen physics. Anyone trying to insist gay just means happy…are going to be left behind in social context terms. Same goes for anyone insisting certain verbs are only for…something other than physics determined universes.

  33. callan


    Okay, so evolutionary scientist use the word ‘design’ without somehow indicating they are subscribing to some god being behind the process. How do they have their cake and eat it too?

    No. They can use whatever language they like and I’m happy to accept they don’t believe in God. Anybody with a modicum of common sense could see that using the word “design” doesn’t require a belief in the paranormal, unless perhaps you live in the US bible belt

    Did you read my response properly ? My reply amounted to the fact that using folk language to make technical arguments is a recipe for disaster.

    If Dennett thinks that “men who duck out of the way of a ball” don’t have agency, then he should make it clear. He should say something like “a collection of particles that have the same external properties as a human move in one direction. Another collection of particles shaped like a ball move in another. Their mutual movement is in no way causally connected”.

    I suspect the lack of attraction in using words like that is he wouldn’t sound like a compatibilist, he’d sound like a determinist. And so from that we can conclude he’s probably spinning the situation a bit. Or he’s stupid and doesn’t realise it. I’ll go for propaganda.

    Your comments about the scope and extent of the word ‘gay’ I’ll leave to the linguistics experts.

    JBD

  34. Stephen


    I wasn’t really thinking about physics, which is limited to the scientific study of particles and their behaviour. I was thinking about how everything is made from these particles and how there is, seemingly, a causal chain from them through to molecules, structures, cells, etc. to form things like brains or computer processors. After all, there are no thoughts without brains and no brains without elementary particles.

    Well – determinism originates in the study of physics. Why else would you be a determinist? Physics gives the only reason (assuming we’re being scientific). I’m not sure you entirely clarify the reason you’re a determinist if you think your reasons originate elsewhere. For instance, simply because a brain consists of particles doesn;t make it deterministic, unless we assume those particles are governed by the laws of physics. And although the motion of particles may be deterministic, that doesn’t necessitate that the thoughts they produce be deterministic too, as there is currently no deterministic theory tying neural activity to mental processes.

    JBD

  35. John

    Yes, if there is nothing tying neural activity to mental processes then that effectively squashes the deterministic argument. I think it is self evident that they are related – no brains, no thoughts. There is other evidence they are related, such as the fMRI studies relating to global workspace theory and picking up yes/no responses from patients thinking of x or y scenarios using EEG. Is there any evidence they are not tightly linked?

    A further complication of the idea that they are not related is how mental activity would have an effect on neurons so that movement could be effected. Neurons are definitely required to duck out of the way, type responses on blogs etc.

  36. Stephen

    The case for some kind of correspondence between mental events and neural activity is pretty clear. But as to that being deterministic – well, that’s far less clear. In fact, it’s not proven at all.

    It’s not really up to me to prove that mental events aren’t tightly linked to neural events. Rather, as the hypothesis provider, it is up to the people who think that thinking is deterministic to prove the point. It’s a standard type of computationalist response – try to burden everybody else with the proof of disproof. Well, science doesn’t work like that. Your ideas don’t succeed just because there isn’t anything else out there. You still need poitive proof of what you’re claiming and that’s a tough job. There’s no evidence that mental processes are deterministic.

    Incidentally – neurons are only necessary for ducking IF you believe in agency. Otherwise, of course, in a deterministic world, there is no ducking. The neurons do what they were always going to do and the ball does what it was always going to do. The movement of the person and the movement of the ball are not related.

    JBD

  37. John

    Since there are no proven mechanisms of how conscious mental activity and neural activity are related, I guess that presents a problem to every theory, not just determinism (and just presenting an inadequate theory doesn’t make a case stronger, either).

    In any case I think it is irrelevant. If neurons cause mental activity then it is unnecessary for deterministic theory to figure out how that happens. It is sufficient to determine that neural activity is described by it’s molecular biology and that the molecular biology is described by the physical behaviour of elementary particles. If neurons don’t cause mental activity then it is a completely different story.

    “Incidentally – neurons are only necessary for ducking IF you believe in agency.”

    No, that is incorrect. Neurons are necessary for ducking because they cause muscles to move. The neurons fire because Ca+ and K+ ions move through channels in the neural walls, neurotransmitters diffuse across synaptic junctions and other biochemical events take place. These things happen because of intermolecular forces on the molecules and ions. It’s a causal chain starting with the behaviour of elementary particles complicated by a lot of feedback loops and complex structures.

    “The movement of the person and the movement of the ball are not related”

    The isolation between events that you propose doesn’t exist. The person moves because light bounces off the moving ball and impinges on the person’s eye. Neurons fire in a complex series resulting in the person ducking (or not ducking, as the case may be).

  38. If you lived in a world where the temperature never went below 0 deg C, the wetness of water and its relation to energy would not be correlated because of the absence of data when the temp goes below 0 C.

    Mind is probably inside the neurons but they are simply lacking the observational data to prove it. The fact that the neocortex excels at making the external world feel and appear so external leads to the common sense dualisms that feel so intuitively obvious.

  39. Stephen,

    “The isolation between events that you propose doesn’t exist. The person moves because light bounces off the moving ball and impinges on the person’s eye. Neurons fire in a complex series resulting in the person ducking (or not ducking, as the case may be).”

    No one disagrees with what you are saying in lay terms. But none of that description refers to a physical cause which starts the physical activity of the body.

    Your description necessitates that the photons reflecting off the ball carry a meaning that initiates causation. None of the molecules involved in the phenomena care about the moving ball. Moreover, there is no causal path to myosin/actin contraction from light bouncing off objects. Because, in physics, there is no such thing as a ball. there is no such thing as a reflection of a ball, there is no such thing as an eye, or a person. When a photon bounces off a molecule and then hits an opsin molecule there is no information available about that photons origin. When the opsin molecule folds and then engages in other molecular chemical interactions there is no information there was a photon to the subsequent molecules. When Na+ ion channels close reducing glutamate available to bipolar cells. there is no information about light at all. And on down the line. We know a bunch of physical activity occurs. But in none of the physical activity is information. What you are saying is a reasonable description of what happens, from out point of view. It is not a descriptiong of HOW the phenomena happens.

    How does an idea of a moving ball cause the molecluar activity? Your description mixes up ideas and physics as if the two kinds of things interact – out there in the universe. There is no evidence, anywhere, that particular ideas change physics at all. (excepting quantum observation effects).

    And yet… what you describe does happen. But there is no initiating physical cause to move the mass of molecules we call a body, out of the way of the ball. The molecules do not care if they get hit. Which means the cause of the body’s movement must be a non-physical thing, an idea. An idea like avoiding pain. Pain does not exist in physics. And ideas about pain do not exist in physics. The molecules feel no pain, so why should they orchestrate in any particular way to avoid it? What would cause the orchestration?

    “No, that is incorrect. Neurons are necessary for ducking because they cause muscles to move.”

    I believe you misunderstand John and other’s arguments from the physics. From the physics standpoint, there is no such thing as a neuron.

    You correctly describe a physical event that occurs in a groups of molecules WE refer to as neurons. But neurons are not physical things in themselves. The physical activity we refer to as neuronal activity is not caused by the neuron. the neuron does not DO anything. All of a neurons activity are particle interactions alone and those interactions are caused by the particles themselves. whether molecules form shapes that allow ions to pass through them has exactly no causal relationship to the larger persistent structure of molecules we refer to as the neuron. All physical activity is intrinsic to those particles involved in that local activity.

    very simply neurons are ideas, they are not physical phenomena at all.

    And yet we move to not get hit.

    Which means there must be a relationship between non-physical things – ideas and representations to the physics of the molecules. Obviously we do move because of ideas and it’s the molecules which do all the movement activity. But our ideas do not CAUSE the movement – that is physically impossible. And that leaves, as far as I can tell, only one possibility. Ideas and molecular structures co-occur. Molecular structures will form instances of ideas, and ideas as molecular structures will instantiate other ideas and other molecular activity.

    On the left side is physics – where there are no ideas and causation runs from the bottom up. All causation derives from particle level forces. On the right side are representational phenomena – ideas, semantics, etc. these are all non-physical. In human beings, the ideas appear to drive causation down towards molecular events, and molecular events appear to cause ideas to happen from the bottom up. (bi-directional causation).

    but how can that be possible? Because the molecular activity instantiates the idea of a cell, of a neuron. The right set of molecular activity generates an instance of a cell. The cell connects a complex set of representations, including the idea of a “self” to molecular activity. It is at the level of the cell where the two kinds of phenomena, particles and ideas, meet.

    Groups of neurons can create patterns of interactions. This is like cellular automata which also create patterns. (Cellular automata can also create complex machine, like calculators and turing machines.) Patterns of cellular activity are not physical things; patterns are idea things. Yes, neurons can fire in patterns, but the molecular activity to cause the firing has no relationship to the patterns being formed. When “Ca+ and K+ ions move through channels in the neural walls” that is behavior intrinsic to the involved particles. That intrinsic behavior and the larger neuron firing pattern is an example of co-occurrence. We might say it is an example where the molecular activity generates an instance of pattern, but it is actually an example where the molecular interactions and a pattern co-occur. And we might say that light from a ball causes us to move, but it’s actually light from a ball which co-occurs with a pattern and ideas that also co-occur with molecular activity.

    I want to be clear that co-occurrence of representations and molecular activity is my view. It is not JBD’s or anyone else’s to my knowledge. But any suggestion of something stronger than co-occurrence requires describing the stronger effect. It requires describing how ideas and physics interact. I do not believe physics and ideas can interact at all. Which means to explain the effects we see requires a different framework. And IMHO, co-occurrence is the only thing that fits the bill.

  40. Stephen

    ” If neurons cause mental activity then it is unnecessary for deterministic theory to figure out how that happens. It is sufficient to determine that neural activity is described by it’s molecular biology and that the molecular biology is described by the physical behaviour of elementary particles. If neurons don’t cause mental activity then it is a completely different story.”

    That’s a phrase with a lot of underlying assumptions whihc I’ll make clear :-


    “It is sufficient to determine that neural activity is described by it’s molecular biology and that the molecular biology is described by the physical behaviour of elementary particles.”

    which should be appended with “and there is a unique, pro-rata deterministic mechanism that uniquely relates a mental event to a neural event in which the entirety of the causal mechanisms that cause the mental event can be described in the current corpus of physical laws, thus creating a definite correlation between a mental event and a neural event”


    No, that is incorrect. Neurons are necessary for ducking because they cause muscles to move. The neurons fire because Ca+ and K+ ions move through channels in the neural walls

    No. We are talking the world of particle physics and the laws of physics and the story of the universe since the big bang. The Universe at time(t) determines the universe at time (t+d). That’s been so since the big bang event. You can’t chop time and decide that point A is a cause of a later event at point B. That doesn’t mean anything. “Cause” is actually a free will term : in the story of physics, it has no place. Atoms, muscle movement and notions like these are human perspectives, not physical perspectives. A man doesn’t duck out of the way of a ball in a physical (as in “physics”) perspctive not just because there are no verbs – there are no humans either, no muscles, no balls, no calcium ions – just particles in motion (of which calcium ions aren’t one, incidentally) with each particle position related to the last by only the laws of physics, stretching back to the creation of the universe.

    It’s a rather dull story but that’s what determinism actually is. Lots of people call themselves determinists but they love the idea that they can choose an arbitrary time at which to start the causal ball rolling. They love verbs, non-physics objects.. more cake and eating it.

    JBD

  41. John

    Well, I agree I may have overreached by saying that deterministic theory doesn’t require an explanation of how mental activity is caused by neural activity.

    I believe you can say that A caused B and still be within the bounds of determinism. The reason is that X caused A. There is no statement that A appeared without any cause. By cause, I don’t mean anything to do with free will. I mean that particles are responding all the time to the various forces that interact between them, and don’t move about on their own initiative.

    “The Universe at time(t) determines the universe at time (t+d).”

    Yes, I think that is exactly what determinists believe.

    “Atoms, muscle movement and notions like these are human perspectives, not physical perspectives. A man doesn’t duck out of the way of a ball in a physical (as in “physics”) perspctive not just because there are no verbs – there are no humans either, no muscles, no balls, no calcium ions – just particles in motion”

    Well yes, it is a perspective. That doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist, though. You can look at a tree as a large object with a trunk, branches and leaves or you can look at it as a system of components carrying out respiration, photosynthesis, etc. or as groups of cells or as a bunch of molecules. It’s still a tree, though, and it really does exist.

    BTW, I’ll reiterate that I am agnostic on determinism. I’m just looking for a sensible argument that would falsify it, but haven’t seen one yet.

  42. I’m not sure why lazy jargon use means anything. I could say my lap top works, but saying that is a lazy way of simply glossing over a million processes inside it, as could be described by computer science.

    If someone says a man dodges a ball, it’s lazy term use. Determinists are lazy in their language, sure. Granted some might be using that imprecise language to try and back two horses, so that’s something to consider.

    But in the end (or more exactly, in the start), why the universe came to exist is a bit fuzzy – ’cause’ isn’t a free will term except in why the universe was free to come to exist at all (for it to then become the conglomerations of atoms that could be identified as a man and a ball, should we indulge such human parochialism (including whether we indulge the word ‘we’))?

    If someone says their computer works, I wouldn’t treat them as thinking some kind of non physics process is happening it. It’d be uncharitable.

  43. I don’t see how determinism brings any logical sense of reality.

    Is it any less random that there are laws that, for no good reason, stay constant? If A -> B always holds, and never becomes A -> C/D/etc, that’s as arbitrary as randomness. And these regularities are extrapolated into supposed laws.

    Determinism is just a comforting bias for people psychologically predisposed to want a mechanistic explanation rather than a random one.

    We probably need something other than randomness or determinism*, maybe a revisit to Scholasticism or Gregg Rosenberg’s Place for Consciousness.

    *Or, at the least, those who really need a reality that makes sense do. Perhaps there are just contradictions, or reality is fundamentally absurd.

  44. Sci,

    I’m not sure I understand…you seem to be saying A leading to B consistently is just as arbitrary as randomness, as if that lends a critique.

    I agree it’s just as arbitrary. But I’m not sure how that matters – life is a pattern that relies on consistencies to be able to fall into existence/a repeating pattern and for that pattern to keep repeating. Sure, it’s as arbitrary as random relations – and it’s the platform your life rests upon. You just are – doesn’t matter if it seems arbitrary, you are alive and will continue to be due to A leading to B, regardless of how arbitrary A leading to B is. So I’m not sure how it’s a critique?

    It’s not like people are mentioning A leads to B because they choose to say that’s important. That’s horse before the cart stuff. We don’t make ‘A leads to B’ be important, ‘A leads to B’ is why we are here at all. We don’t lead to it, it leads to us. I mean, are you going to say Heliocentricism is actually something people say because of having poor self esteem, as opposed to Geocentricism?

    That the earth revolves around the sun – that’s arbitrary as well. But would that arbitrariness make a good critique of Heliocentricism?

  45. Well we might also be here due to randomness at a variety of levels. But more to the point the Determinist argument seems to come not from physics – which makes an increasing case for possibility of randomness – but from a supposed logical conclusion.

    What the Determinist wants is for reality to exist in a certain way that reduces their own existential angst. That things happen for no reason is Lovecraftian in its own way, or at the least it summons Sartre’s Nausea.

    Yet there isn’t anything to really hold the causal chain in place, in fact we might as well say it is Randomness mercifully arranging itself in a certain way that allows life to exist (I think this is Meillassoux’s Hyper Chaos?). No Platonic Law could interact with matter, that’s just Dualism, and even if we could square that what holds those Laws in place eternally?

    It’s either God or Chance, just pick your poison and drink deep. 😉

    There’s a larger argument to be made that people’s “isms” regarding philosophical questions say more about their own personal hangups than Reality, though my guess is while people are happy to leave their free will to Physics or God’s Plan the idea that supposed rationality is driven by varied fears/needs/conditioned aesthetics/etc won’t go over so well. 🙂

  46. Stephen


    “That doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist, though.”

    Actually, it does. Trees, cars, humans have no existence in a physics ontology. If you are using a framework for determinism based upon physics you can’t use words like ‘human’ or ’cause’ (in the classic sense) as they mean nothing. There is only one class of ’cause’ in physics – the generic cause classes of physical forces, but in that context they are not associable with a specific start point in time – which the general human frame of cause requires. There is only one “classic-linguistical” cause in physics – the Big Bang. All the rest is the flow of physics history, with one moment melting into another.

    J

  47. Sci


    Determinist argument seems to come not from physics – which makes an increasing case for possibility of randomness

    I’ve seen some of those arguments and I think they have a tendency to confuse randomness with ideas inherent to wave equations.

    Sometimes they confuse “randomness” with the idea of probability in quantum mechanics. They aren’t the same thing. A particle at point A could , in the next second be anywhere within the scope of the speed of light at the next. But the probability is in fact extremely high that it will be within a certain location – not equally likely in anylocation, which ‘randomness’ implies.

    The fact that quantum mechanics uses probability doesn’t make it non-deterministic either. On the contrary it says that the wave equation for a particle develops in a very deterministic way indeed. Given that wave-particle duality is a basic fact, we can simply rely on the wave nature of matter to in fact conclude that quantum physics is as deterministic as classical physics, but doesn’t claim to be able to provide pinpoint accuracy for position and speed, which according to quantum physics is an impossibility in the first place.

    What tends to make a complete farce of physics though are even modest levels of statistical complexity, which make even less-than–pinpont-quantum physics resort very quickly to the generalising, imprecise tools of thermodynamics for even modestly complicated systems.

    Therefore the idea that physics – as a tool – “can determine” the development of the universe of unspeakable numbers of particles is ludicrous. The masses of tools out there can scarcely map 5 days weather to any accuracy. The reality is that in a quantum system there is a distribution of systemic outcomes that is ‘predicted’ or determined by physics, each with a slightly different possibility. It makes the very idea of ‘determined’ bizarre, as the natural development of the universe – according to physics – is an almost infinite possibility of outcomes, each with a different probability. As you rightly say Sci, “cause” in that context really is a silly idea.

    JBD

  48. Sci, you’re handing out psychological evaluations there…but without writing any consideration that you are coming from a psychological position yourself. Maybe it’s you who really needs things to be random? To avoid your own kind of existential angst? There are tons of people who like to deal out judgement of others, but when it comes to them they think any kind of judgement of them is misplaced – insulting, even. And they are a trainwreck to talk to, as they can dish it out but they can’t take it.

    No Platonic Law could interact with matter

    Sounds like a set in concrete law itself, rather than a randomness.

  49. @ JBD:

    Putting aside QM, which I merely brought up b/c of the recent hidden variable loop hole closures, I think we’re in agreement that if the issue is things happening for no reason then determinism and randomness are equally arbitrary?

    It seems to me Efficient Causality – which just lists causes that are requirements for an effect – cannot really explain why the particular effect happens.

    @ Callan:

    I didn’t exclude myself -> In fact that is the point, there are likely no satisfying answers to fundamental metaphysical questions just answers that feed psychological needs. As Chomsky puts it, why would a monkey evolved to run away from tigers end up with a brain that explains fundamental questions like Consciousness and Causation?

    As to the idea that no Platonic Law interacts with matter, that’s just the basic argument against Dualism and the fact Natural Laws can’t be material things. Is there a good argument that enables two substances that are of completely different kinds to interact? Seems to me even Hyper Chaos cannot make Dualism workable, at least not Cartesian Dualism as I’ve tried to understand it.

    Finally, I never said things are definitively random – my point is that one cannot appeal to logic to claim determinism *must* be true given the very argument – that of a paucity in causal explanation – extends to Determinism as well.

  50. Calvin


    “Your description necessitates that the photons reflecting off the ball carry a meaning that initiates causation. None of the molecules involved in the phenomena care about the moving ball.”

    Exactly.You have explained this much better than me.

    I don’t really have a conclusion other than I don’t know how I can have a conclusion that is even remotely definitive. I live in a world of free will on a day to day basis and i duck out of the way of balls. I can see that physics is highly accurate at predicting physical metrics – as long as the systems are simple – and has no capability for dealing with metrics that are not related to space,time or mass – such as , for instance, the entire corpus of mental phenomema, for which physics has not an ounce of ontological overlap. So the “free will” question is a nonsense to me, as the world of the mental and the world of physics are currently orthogonal. It’s not even a sensible question if you ask me.

    JBD

  51. John,

    Thank you so much. But I was just getting behind your good physics arguments and pushing.

    “the entire corpus of mental phenomena, for which physics has not an ounce of ontological overlap.”

    What happens if we take that observation as a fact? It entails only a small set of assumptions. That there are mental phenomena which are not physical phenomena. (and vice versa).

    So, what are mental phenomena and physical phenomena? The physical phenomena appear to reduce to particles. And the mental phenomena like qualia and concepts appear to reduce to something like representations or ideas.

    Some people argue mental phenomena requires a mind, but I think that is a bridge too far. It requires a whole set of complex assumptions that create circular or infinite regression arguments. Which means those mind dependent arguments are invalid because they are not explanatory of the mechanisms of representation nor the mechanisms of physics.

    No“ontological overlap” suggests the two kinds of phenomena do not affect each other. But we know this is not the case under observation.

    I use the Trinity experiments and other nuclear events as canonical proof that ideas must affect the physics and vice versa. It’s impossible to describe how Trinity occurs without making reference to ideas. Because fission and radiation are so destructive to organic structures, the organic structures themselves must know that radiation will destroy them – before the fact – and act accordingly as they collect uranium and other elements. The organic structures have to represent the fact concentrations of uranium will destroy themselves before they ever get to an atomic explosion.

    The Trinity example voids materialist arguments that consciousness etc are illusions because the contents of consciousness (knowledge of physics) must exist to achieve Trinity. And knowledge , ideas, mental contents are explicitly non-physical.

    I recently heard someone else make a similar argument about satellites. Ours is the only known planet that ejects satellites into it’s orbit. Or that ejects asteroids into the solar system to orbit and crash on other planets. There is no observable physical factor which explains why carbon-water sacks on this planet collect molecules, form them into complex structures, and then eject them from the planet. The activity defies the astro-physical facts we know about every other galactic object. If you were an alien astrophysicist looking at the earth, it’s behavior would be very strange.

    This suggests there is a hidden force which causes the satellite formation, fusion, and fission events, etc. But under observation of the carbon bags we see there are no hidden physical forces driving their activity. Physical forces are the sole cause of all physical phenomena everywhere, even in the “bags”. Atomic explosions and satellites are weird outcomes to get from the physics, but ONLY physical phenomena caused Trinity and Voyager 1.

    Except its the most complicated means of achieving those events anywhere. The complexity itself is problematic from a physical standpoint.

    The only other hidden factor that we know of, once all the physical phenomena are excluded, are ideas. the ideas and physics must interact for Trinity and Mars Rovers to occur. If there is an actual interaction, then there must be a mechanism of interaction. A force, a process, a something that mediates the interaction. But ideas and particles are orthogonal. We can, in theory, explain Trinity and satellites using physics alone. No ideas are necessary.

    But we can’t explain the complexity of the physics. The complexity of the physics requires that ideas and particles interact. This is the contradiction. If interaction is impossible or unnecessary what other explanations remain?

    If physical phenomena and mental phenomena are orthogonal and do not interact directly, the only thing that remains is that physical and mental phenomena must overlap. That means when we think of the physical and mental phenomena interacting, it is not an interaction but a co-occurrence of overlapping phenomena. We observe interaction, but no interaction actually occurs.

    Co-occurrences look like interactions but they are not interactions. Correlation is a kind of co-occurrence. coincidence is a kind of co-occurrence. Mimicry and imitation are kinds of co-occurrence. But overlapping contents makes no real sense (no set of molecules forms “War and Peace”). Which would suggest that what overlaps is not the content but functions of representation. If functions of representation overlap with physical functions then I think the possibility of co-occurrence has some legs to stand on. (even if they are ghostly legs)

    Hopefully, someone makes the quantum argument here. The kind of quantum measurement affects the observed behavior of particles. And that is a sort of idea/particle overlap phenomena. The general argument of overlap between ideas/physics underpins many quantum arguments for consciousness and for free-will.

    Do you or anyone else see any other possibility besides overlap between mental and physical phenomena? If there is no mechanism of interaction what else is there? Can co-occurrence account for the facts, even if it is an unlikely explanation. Is there a third kind of possibility?

  52. John – 46

    ” ‘That doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist, though.’

    Actually, it does. Trees, cars, humans have no existence in a physics ontology. ”

    I think you are confusing perspective and scope with the reality of huge numbers of particles interacting. Certainly physics only deals with the interactions between a few particles at a time. To do more is overly complex and doesn’t help our understanding of what is occurring. To understand that, we study chemistry, biology, etc. That doesn’t mean that billions of particles are not interacting in a certain way that results in the creation of higher order entities.

    To return to the ball ducking scenario, one photon doesn’t know anything about balls. Billions of photons hitting a ball with some being absorbed, some being reflected and some missing the ball altogether can be detected by our visual mechanisms due to the order resulting from the collisions between the photons and the ball molecules.

    The deterministic argument just acknowledges the existence of the huge number of interactions between particles, without bothering to try to discuss each separate interaction.

  53. Calvin


    And the mental phenomena like qualia and concepts appear to reduce to something like representations or ideas.

    I don’t think so. Qualia may be linked to ideas or concepts indirectly but they’re not the same. The feeling that I’m hungry is not the same as the idea of hunger. One is a mental phenomena and the other isn’t.


    No“ontological overlap” suggests the two kinds of phenomena do not affect each other.

    Not really. It suggests there is no ontological overlap and that’s all. It suggests that the man-made creation called physics doesn’t deal with mental phenomena. It says nothing about nature.


    Hopefully, someone makes the quantum argument here.

    Hopefully not. It’s bound to be nonsense.

    JBD

  54. Stephen


    I think you are confusing perspective and scope with the reality of huge numbers of particles interacting.

    Not confusing anything. There is nothing other than particles and fields of force in the ontology of physics and you can’t duck out of that to slip a bit of “cause” in while nobody’s looking. Words like human, tree, duck, are all from the free-will based causal perspective of a conscious agent. You can’t start off from a non-causal world – physics- take one of its theses – determinism – and decide you don’t like it that much so you’ll slip a bit of free will and cause in there because it makes you feel better. It’s a fraud.


    That doesn’t mean that billions of particles are not interacting in a certain way that results in the creation of higher order entities.

    You’ll have to show me where you think I’m meant to have said that. Because I wouldn’t. I think I said “physics is too stupid to know that humans exist, so you have to tell it”. Which is exactly what you just did.


    visual mechanisms

    There are no visual mechanisms in physics. You can’t swap ontologies and chop and change like it’s a sweet shop. You’re a determinist ? Fine. There are no causes, no effects, no points in time different to any other. That’s physics. The rest – the men ducking (displaying agency) is a heap of baloney based upon a switch to a non-physical ontology that incorporates free will and cause as founding concepts.

    JBD

  55. John

    I think you have intellectualized yourself into an absurd position. You seem to think that humans and elementary particles have nothing to do with each other, even though humans are entirely composed of elementary particles. The physics ontology you are using to justify your position is just an abstraction created by humans that allows us to understand what is going on. It doesn’t restrict any physical or mental events.

    Cause, in the physical domain, has nothing to do with free will. If a radiant heat source causes an electron to move to a higher orbital there is a cause and an effect. If an atom interacts with another atom because it has an energized electron, that is cause and effect. From a human perspective, it is just frying an egg. They are two different perspectives of the same events.

  56. Stephen


    “You seem to think that humans and elementary particles have nothing to do with each other, even though humans are entirely composed of elementary particles. ”

    Humans are composed of elementary particles but are not defined by them. Physics does not have the capability to look at a collection of particles and say “that is a human”. That’s because physics doesn’t know what humans are.

    Likewise physics doesn’t know what causes are, in the human lingustic sense of the term. There is no time different to any other, hence no causes can exist. One universe at time T has a relation to the universe at time (T+d) solely on the basis of continuous mathematical equations. There is no role for interventions, or ’causes’ along the line of human actions.

    It’s actually mpore consistent than yours – like Dennett you are having your cake and eating it, choosing free will terms when it suits you and physics terms when it doesn’t.


    “If a radiant heat source causes an electron to move to a higher orbital there is a cause and an effect.”

    That is human perspective cause. In physics terms it’s a pointless exercise to call a ‘radiant heat source’ a cause in isolation, as the activity of the radiant heat source is “caused” by something else. And that is “caused” by something else, all the way back to the big bang. You’ve given an example of human perspective cause by choosing to arbitrarily isolate a point in time. In the historiography of the universe though, it’s pointless to talk off the radiant heat source as being a ’cause’ any more than any other antecedent event. It’s neat language – easy to use in physics classes – but in a discussion of determinism where precision is all, it’s hopelessly jumbled nonsense.

    JBD

  57. John

    Thought this one was dead and buried. 😉

    “Humans are composed of elementary particles but are not defined by them.”

    Well then, what does define a human? Emergent behaviour? That is just another way of saying that the relationship among all the moving parts is complicated and not possible to sum up in a sentence or two. Hopefully you won’t suggest something mystical.

    “it’s a pointless exercise to call a ‘radiant heat source’ a cause in isolation, as the activity of the radiant heat source is “caused” by something else. And that is “caused” by something else, all the way back to the big bang.”

    Well yes, that is exactly the argument of a determinist. It leaves no room for free will or any sort of dualism.

  58. Stephen

    Sorry, didn’t check the dates.


    “Well then, what does define a human”

    Are you telling me you don’t know what one is ? You “need” a definition ? If you do, there is a definition, the only meaningful one. A biological definition. A human is a member of the species homo sapiens. A human has a series of biological attributes, not one of which can be reduced to descriptions of matter in motion.

    Now I could take a human being, view him as a series of particles – “matter in motion” – and I’d lose a huge amount of information in the process. I couldn’t take a series of descriptions of particles in motion and conclude that it was male member of the species with an interest in sex, for instance. “Male”, “Sex” even “species” are terms irreducible to the lexicon of motion. (mapping is not the same as reduction, incidentally. We are talking about information, not modelling systems). There is semantic content in term “male” that cannot be mapped to any semantic contents in the notions of length, time and mass that are the entire semantic width of physics, making it thereby irreducible to the same.

    That biology is not reducible to physics I don’t think is hugely controversial nowadays. Noam Chomksy – hardly a dualist and a committed materialist – has argued much the same for decades.


    Well yes, that is exactly the argument of a determinist. It leaves no room for free will or any sort of dualism.

    Indeed. Or any sort of isolated cause. In a determined world, a robot or a human can’t “duck” any more than a human can, exactly because he is a collection of particles and to that extent, non-existent as an independent entity. The scope of the human’s existence is determined entirely from a third party perspective and is not a result of any inherent physical properties – IF we are using a physical framework. If we aren’t and are maybe using a common-sense biological framework – then humans exist and their physical constituency is merely theoretical and we can freely talk about humans ‘doing’ things and having agency and living in a world of causes.

    JBD

  59. John

    “A human is a member of the species homo sapiens. A human has a series of biological attributes, not one of which can be reduced to descriptions of matter in motion.”

    I haven’t been arguing that a physics explanation of anything “reduces” it by providing a simpler explanation. What I have been saying is that every biological attribute can be explained in terms of it’s physical presence expressed in molecular (or sub-molecular) terms. It is pretty straightforward for physical attributes such as sex organs, but even if we are talking of behaviour or thoughts such as our sexual self-identification it is also true. The idea that we are of a particular sex requires a brain for the concept to exist. No brains, no thoughts. Brains are made up of molecules and the concept that exists in our minds is entirely dependent on the pattern of motion of basic particles that make up our brains.

    “That biology is not reducible to physics I don’t think is hugely controversial nowadays.”

    I believe that what is accepted thought is that reducing biology to physics offers no additional insight into biology. In that sense, biology is irreducible. I wouldn’t argue about that. I don’t think it is generally accepted that it is not possible, in principle, to explain biology in terms of physics, though. That would be a logical inconsistency to any materialist.

    “The scope of the human’s existence is determined entirely from a third party perspective”

    We seem to agree on the argument but draw different conclusions. Where I see one thing viewed from different perspectives you see several things, depending on the perspective.

    Cheers
    Stephen

  60. Stephen


    It is pretty straightforward for physical attributes such as sex organs, but even if we are talking of behaviour or thoughts such as our sexual self-identification it is also true

    OK. Explain the mechanism. Tell me about “gender” for instance. Give me an expression of time, length and mass that encapsulates the semantic of “gender”. Mapping – as I have said – is not the same and you can’t use it.


    “Brains are made up of molecules and the concept that exists in our minds is entirely dependent on the pattern of motion of basic particles that make up our brains.


    That is a physics-based substantial simplification. Brains cause minds – that is by far the most likely explanation – but the idea that the whole of that behaviour can be encapsulated by the description of particles in motion is just self-evidently completely wrong. Humans obsessed with physics see only an object consisting of kg/m/s. In fact this is a totally inadequate way of seeing the brain, as no combination of length, time and mass can encapsulate the complexity of even the smallest semantic idea like “gender”. Minds cannot be reduced to physics.

    Physics does not and cannot explain the totality of the natural mechanisms in the brain. It was designed by Galileo and Newton to provide a system of support for certain types of basic measurement. It wasn’t designed as an explanation for everything, but that’s precisely what it’s become since the death of religion.


    “I don’t think it is generally accepted that it is not possible, in principle, to explain biology in terms of physics, though.That would be a logical inconsistency to any materialist.”

    Not at all. Watch Chomsky explain it. He doesn’t see humans as computers or bits of maths. We are biological organisms with cognitive scope and limits. He views it as self-evident that physics is just another thing that humans do – a biological artefact.It’s not going to be perfect, no matter how much propaganda and dogma the physics departments drown the world in.

    Give yourself an example. Ask yourself what inherent physical properties constitute a biological organism ? You are NOT allowed to map, which introduces ad-hoc structure from a 3rd party perspective. Remember – cells, sexual reproduction – these are not terms of physics and are not defined in terms of physics. You must restrict yourself to descriptions of matter, time and space. Nor is “contains deoxiribosenucleic acid” a sufficient description – that refers to a chemical.

    JBD

  61. “OK. Explain the mechanism.”

    Well, I did. Not in terms of describing the behaviour of each of billions of small particles and their interactions which eventually result in our brain processes. No one is likely to do that or even want to. It just isn’t useful and we can’t hold that massive amount of information in our heads. That’s why we simplify and abstract things and call it biology or some other branch of science.

    On the other hand, there is no sensible argument for saying that the thoughts our brains produce are not related to the physical world. It’s just wishful thinking. All of your statements – e.g.:

    – the idea that the whole of that behaviour can be encapsulated by the description of particles in motion is just self-evidently completely wrong
    – no combination of length, time and mass can encapsulate the complexity of even the smallest semantic idea like “gender”. Minds cannot be reduced to physics.

    are completely unsupported other than the “it can’t be so” wishful thinking argument or getting tied up in self-imposed conceptual constraints, either of which is totally unconvincing. All of this type of thinking must result in an unjustified mystical concept of the mind where thoughts exist independent of the physical world.

    “Physics does not and cannot explain the totality of the natural mechanisms in the brain. It was designed by Galileo and Newton to provide a system of support for certain types of basic measurement.”

    They didn’t design anything. What they did was discover relationships in the world around us and describe them using mathematics. These discoveries are still true today, although they have been extended over time, particularly regarding the very tiny and very fast. The development of scientific ideas has extended into chemical reactions, molecular biology, neurobiology and an emerging body of work helping us to understand the mechanisms of how our brains create thoughts. It may be difficult for you to wrap your mind around it, but that doesn’t make it less true.

  62. Stephen


    On the other hand, there is no sensible argument for saying that the thoughts our brains produce are not related to the physical world.

    I never said they weren’t. That’s wishful think on your part. I said that mental events couldn’t be reduced to the discipline of physics, which is completely different.


    are completely unsupported other than the “it can’t be so” wishful thinking argument or getting tied up in self-imposed conceptual constraints, either of which is totally unconvincing

    Well – as I’ve already asked – convince me then ! tell me how the semantic content of the term “male” or “blue” can be reduced to semantic combinations of expressions of length, space and time. That is what reduction requires. When you do so, I’ll pop your Nobel Prize in the post afterwards.


    All of this type of thinking must result in an unjustified mystical concept of the mind where thoughts exist independent of the physical world.

    These are your own fantasies of what I must think, as I don’t agree with you. Brains cause minds and brains are material objects. I suggest you reread anything I’ve said that suggests otherwise.


    What they did was discover relationships in the world around us and describe them using mathematics.

    It’s a system that was created by humans – a work of art. That it gave rise to knowledge of underlying structure – that it ‘found’ things – doesn’t make it less creative. Nor does it make it less human. Physics is not a gift of the gods or the universe. It’s not an answer to everything and has inbuilt semantic and cognitive limitations. That doesn’t mean to say it’s not very useful. But it does mean to say it can’t the answer to everything.

    JBD

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